“…According to our model, if the primary output from the reasoning process is not put through the monitoring stage and, for example, it is not checked with further everyday information (Shallice and Evans, 1978 ), but is directly provided as a result of the estimation, the final output would be a bizarre answer: it is an unreasonable and extremely inaccurate answer which was generally interpreted as a clue of pervasive impairment in cognitive estimation (Della Sala et al, 2003 ). Besides in previous studies relating to cognitive estimation (Appollonio et al, 2003 ; Khodarahimi and Rasti, 2011 ) less attention was generally given to bizarre answers (probably due to some difficulties in outlining an operational and actionable definition of the bizarreness index) it could be considered a remarkable clue about the executive domains involvement in the estimation ability: indeed Parkinson's disease (Appollonio et al, 2003 ), fronto-temporal dementia (Mendez et al, 1998 ), and focal frontal lesions (Shallice and Evans, 1978 ; Taylor and O'Carroll, 1995 ; MacPherson et al, 2014 ), but also schizophrenia (Khodarahimi and Rasti, 2011 ) and major depressive disorder patients (Barabassy et al, 2010 ) reported a poor performance in the cognitive estimation ability, and specifically an higher number of bizarre answers, since the lack of efficacy of executive functions involved in the cognitive estimation process.…”