Abstract:A method to quantify the error probability at the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange is introduced. The types of errors due to statistical inaccuracies in noise voltage measurements are classified and the error probability is calculated. The most interesting finding is that the error probability decays exponentially with the duration of the time window of single bit exchange. The results indicate that it is feasible to have so small error probabilities of the exchanged bits that error corre… Show more
“…As already mentioned above, the known sets must be properly checked, because only choices with degenerated voltage/current/power values can be considered secure-not the singular values. Bit-error analysis [13,14] and error removal is still an open problem in the RRTT-KLJN scheme.…”
Section: Some Practical Considerationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution scheme [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20] is a classical-statistical physical alternative to the quantum key distribution. Figure 1 depicts a binary version of the KLJN scheme and shows that, during a single-bit exchange, the communicating parties (Alice and Bob) connect their randomly chosen resistor (including its Johnson noise generator) to a wire channel.…”
We introduce two new Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR-) KLJN scheme, uses random resistors with values chosen from a quasi-continuum set. It is well-known since the creation of the KLJN concept that such a system could work in cryptography, because Alice and Bob can calculate the unknown resistance value from measurements, but the RR-KLJN system has not been addressed in prior publications since it was considered impractical. The reason for discussing it now is the second scheme, the Random Resistor Random Temperature (RRRT-) KLJN key exchange, inspired by a recent paper of Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl, wherein security was shown to be maintained at non-zero power flow. In the RRRT-KLJN secure key exchange scheme, both the resistances and their temperatures are continuum random variables. We prove that the security of the RRRT-KLJN scheme can prevail at a non-zero power flow, and thus the physical law guaranteeing security is not the Second Law of Thermodynamics but the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. Alice and Bob know their own resistances and temperatures and can calculate the resistance and temperature values at the other end of the communication channel from measured voltage, current and power-flow data in the wire. However, Eve cannot determine these values because, for her, there are four unknown quantities while she can set up only three equations. The RRRT-KLJN scheme has several advantages and makes all former attacks on the KLJN scheme invalid or incomplete.
“…As already mentioned above, the known sets must be properly checked, because only choices with degenerated voltage/current/power values can be considered secure-not the singular values. Bit-error analysis [13,14] and error removal is still an open problem in the RRTT-KLJN scheme.…”
Section: Some Practical Considerationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution scheme [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20] is a classical-statistical physical alternative to the quantum key distribution. Figure 1 depicts a binary version of the KLJN scheme and shows that, during a single-bit exchange, the communicating parties (Alice and Bob) connect their randomly chosen resistor (including its Johnson noise generator) to a wire channel.…”
We introduce two new Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR-) KLJN scheme, uses random resistors with values chosen from a quasi-continuum set. It is well-known since the creation of the KLJN concept that such a system could work in cryptography, because Alice and Bob can calculate the unknown resistance value from measurements, but the RR-KLJN system has not been addressed in prior publications since it was considered impractical. The reason for discussing it now is the second scheme, the Random Resistor Random Temperature (RRRT-) KLJN key exchange, inspired by a recent paper of Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl, wherein security was shown to be maintained at non-zero power flow. In the RRRT-KLJN secure key exchange scheme, both the resistances and their temperatures are continuum random variables. We prove that the security of the RRRT-KLJN scheme can prevail at a non-zero power flow, and thus the physical law guaranteeing security is not the Second Law of Thermodynamics but the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. Alice and Bob know their own resistances and temperatures and can calculate the resistance and temperature values at the other end of the communication channel from measured voltage, current and power-flow data in the wire. However, Eve cannot determine these values because, for her, there are four unknown quantities while she can set up only three equations. The RRRT-KLJN scheme has several advantages and makes all former attacks on the KLJN scheme invalid or incomplete.
“…Also, the duration of the bit sharing period must be long enough compared to the correlation time of the noise , i.e., ≈ 1 , in order to correctly distinguish between the different resistors situations [31,32]. The frequency of secure bit exchange is:…”
Section: Upper Limit Of the Kljn Key Lifetimementioning
confidence: 99%
“…where ≫ 1, see [31,32] and the factor 1 2 is due to the fact that a secure bit exchange occurs (on average) 50% of the time.…”
Section: Upper Limit Of the Kljn Key Lifetimementioning
In a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett., 13 (2014) 1450020] we introduced a vehicular communication system with unconditionally secure key exchange based on the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution scheme. In this paper, we address the secure KLJN key donation to vehicles. This KLJN key donation solution is performed lane-by-lane by using roadside key provider equipment embedded in the pavement. A method to compute the lifetime of the KLJN key is also given. This key lifetime depends on the car density and gives an upper limit of the lifetime of the KLJN key for vehicular communication networks.
“…In the case of perfect secrecy (security), p remains at this value even when Eve is eavesdropping, and the bit-error probability of key exchange between Alice and Bob is irrelevant. We offer the following illustrative example to show the inadequacy in using secrecy rate to judge the security of the KLJN system [39,40]: By manipulating wire resistance, frequency bandwidth and bit-detection thresholds, it is possible to design two different KLJN systems with identical secrecy rate; one of the systems has very poor security (p ≈ 1) while the other has very strong security (p ≈ 0.5).…”
A recent IEEE Access Paper by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) proposed a new transient attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. The attack is valid, but it is easy to build a defense for the KLJN system. Here we note that GAA's paper contains several invalid statements regarding security measures and the continuity of functions in classical physics. These deficiencies are clarified in our present paper, wherein we also emphasize that a new version of the KLJN system is immune against all existing attacks, including the one by GAA.
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