2016
DOI: 10.5935/0034-7140.20160002
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Optimal Insider Strategy with Law Penalties

Abstract: We study the optimal continuous trading strategy of an insider who is subject to the possibility of law penalties due to her illegal trading activity. Also, we discuss how to obtain the optimal penalty rule in order to maximize a welfare function. Estudamos a estratégia contínua ótima de um insider que esta sujeito as penalidades da lei devidas a suas acividades de negócios ilegais. Também, analizamos como obter a regra de penalidade ótima que maximize uma funçao de bem-estar.

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Cited by 1 publication
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“…Guo and Yuan (2012, p. 321) address sanctions as formal controls imposed on employees to ensure compliance with established guidelines, discouraging undesirable attitudes to the organizational environment. Straub (1990) and Fajardo (2016) also state that sanctions function as a "disincentive" to commit a criminal act or to deviate from the stated guidelines.…”
Section: Perceived Penaltymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Guo and Yuan (2012, p. 321) address sanctions as formal controls imposed on employees to ensure compliance with established guidelines, discouraging undesirable attitudes to the organizational environment. Straub (1990) and Fajardo (2016) also state that sanctions function as a "disincentive" to commit a criminal act or to deviate from the stated guidelines.…”
Section: Perceived Penaltymentioning
confidence: 99%