Os sem-voto do Legislativo brasileiro: quem são os senadores suplentes e quais os seus impactos sobre o processo legislativo

Abstract

Este artigo tem dois objetivos principais. O primeiro é elaborar um perfil dos suplentes de Senadores no Brasil em comparação com os Senadores titulares. O segundo objetivo é avaliar a sua atuação política, no intuito de identificar se exercem algum impacto sobre o funcionamento do Senado e sobre a sua relação com o Poder Executivo. Sugerimos que o fato de os suplentes não serem eleitos contribui para que eles sejam designados para tarefas "espinhosas" que poderiam gerar custos políticos para os Senadores titulares. Verificamos também que eles oferecem um apoio ligeiramente maior ao Poder Executivo, especialmente nas coalizões que contam com uma participação maior dos partidos de direita.<br>This article has two main objectives. The first one is to create a profile of Senators' substitutes, compared to the elected Senators. The second objective is to investigate the substitutes' political performance, with the intent of evaluating the impact of their actions on both the functioning of the Senate and their relationship to the Executive Power. We suggest that, because they are not directly elected, they are selected to work on difficult tasks, especially those that could bring negative political effects to the Senators, which depend on the electorate's vote. We also found that the substitutes give a bit more support to the Presidency, particularly observed in right wing parties coalitions

Perfis e trajetórias de parlamentares titulares e suplentes no Senado Federal e na Câmara dos Deputados

“…As diferenças entre Senado e Câmara são esperadas. Em análise de 12 países presidencialistas bicamerais, Neiva (2004) mostra que em todos eles os senadores são mais velhos. A idade mínima exigida para acessar o senado se aproxima da exigida de outras autoridades de alto escalão, como presidentes ou membros da corte suprema, e se distancia da dos deputados.…”

Formal Comparisons of Legislative Institutions: Comparing ideal points from the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate in Brazil

“…It may also be the case that the Senate votes differently owing to its purpose (Neiva and Soares 2013), its specific powers (Neiva 2008), the senior and perhaps conservative profile of the senators themselves (many are former presidential candidates, governors, party leaders and ex-ministers), or the high level of un-elected suplentes (stand-ins) in the Senate (Neiva and Izumi 2012); the hypotheses above will allow to establish if there is a difference in voting behavior between the Senate and the Chamber and its magnitude. These questions of why there is a difference are an important area for further research.…”

Does the Electoral Rule Matter for Political Polarization? The Case of Brazilian Legislative Chambers

“…The idea is simply to elucidate first a qualitative finding-the existence of an influence of the electoral rules on the polarization of the legislative bodies-and then make an attempt to quantify that effect. One study that would walk alongside this one is Neiva and Izumi (2012). One finding in that paper is that senators substitute votes more in line with the Executive branch.…”