Competition in the Brazilian loan market: an empirical analysis

Abstract

ResumoNeste artigo, o objetivo é rever os testes empíricos existentes para o grau de competição no setor bancário brasileiro, assim como propor algumas alternativas. Após a descrição do ambiente institucional do sistema bancário brasileiro, os testes sobre a competição, presentes na literatura, foram revisados, começando com o proposto por Panzar e Rosse (1987). A principal conclusão que pode ser extraída desta análise é que o mercado não aparenta estar em equilíbrio de longo prazo, indicando que o mercado não é regido por condições de colusão perfeita. O passo seguinte foi tentar uma nova metodolodia aplicada por Moreno, Martínez e Ruiz (2006) para o mercado bancário espanhol. Nesta metodologia, em que a hipótese de igualdade dos parâmetros de conduta entre empresas e ao longo do tempo é relaxada, os resultados indicam que, para algumas empresas e em alguns instantes do tempo, uma conduta coo-perativa está presente. Palavras-Chave competição bancária AbstractThe aim of this paper is to review some of the existing tests for competition in Brazilian banking, as well as to propose an alternative. After the description of the institutional setting of the Brazilian Banking system on this period, the competition tests on the literature were reviewed, beginning with the test proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987). The market does not seem to be in long-run equilibrium, implying only the market does not seem to find itself in collusive outcome. The next step was to try a new methodology, applied by Moreno, Martínez and Ruiz (2006) for the Spanish banking market. On this methodology, in which the assumption of equality of conduct parameters between firms and time periods is relaxed, the results indicate that, for some firms and in some time periods, a cooperative conduct in fact is present.

Banking competition in the Brazilian economy

“…If seasonality is not removed from the database, all bank profi les would be erroneously classifi ed as operating in monopolistic competition. This result is in accordance with Belaisch (2003), Lucinda (2010) and Araujo and Jorge Neto (2007), who do not mention any treatment for seasonal effects in their database. Table 5 presents, side by side, the estimates from the seasonally-adjusted and non-seasonally-adjusted series.…”

“…Lucinda (2010) attempted to estimate a model without including scale variables (not reported in his paper), but argued that the estimates of the H-statistics were even greater than when scale variables were included. Finally, it is noteworthy that the similarity of the non-seasonally-adjusted results from Table 5 with those of Tabak, Gomes, and Medeiros Junior (2015) reinforces the fact that omitting such treatment might bias the assessment of the correct market structure for the Brazilian banking sector.…”

“…Thus, changes in names or classifications of banks during the period did not generate any diffi culty for the 7 It is worth mentioning that the effects of seasonality might be smaller in lower frequency data (semi-annual, for instance). Thus, the potential problems for the estimates might be smaller in Belaisch (2003) and Araújo and Jorge Neto (2007), who used semi-annual data, and Lucinda (2010), who used quarterly data, when compared to our estimates, which are based on monthly data. organization of information.…”

“…Evidence of a competitive banking sector is provided by Lucinda (2010), Araújo, Jorge Neto, and Ponce (2006), Araújo and Jorge Neto (2007), and Nakane (2002). It is noteworthy that Lucinda (2010) applies the Panzar-Rosse model to panel data, while Tabak, Gomes, and Medeiros Jr. (2015) and Araujo and Jorge Neto (2007) perform the estimation for various cross sections. Nakane (2002) applies the model by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) to aggregate the time series of the Brazilian banking system.…”

Spread bancário e enforcement contratual: Hipótese de causalidade reversa e evidência empírica

“…Um dos aspectos estudados é o das margens dos bancos, que têm sido relativamente elevadas, e o nível de competição no mercado bancário brasileiro (Belaisch, 2003;FMI, 2012). Lucinda (2010) não encontrou evidência de colusão perfeita, L. S. Alencar (2011) encontrou evidência de que a consolidação no setor bancário impactou o nível de spreads e Nakane & Rocha (2010) concluíram haver razoável nível de competição no mercado bancário brasileiro. Barbosa, Rocha & Salazar (2015) e Barbosa, Cardoso & Azevedo (2016), no entanto, alertaram para a existência de viés de superestimação da intensidade de concorrência bancária.…”