2015
DOI: 10.1590/s0101-31732015000100011
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Reliability and Social Knowledgerelevant Responsibility

Abstract: Knowledge seems to need the admixture of de facto reliability and epistemic responsibility. But philosophers have had a hard time in attempting to combine them in order to achieve a satisfactory account of knowledge. In this paper I attempt to find a solution by capitalizing on the real and ubiquitous human phenomenon that is the social dispersal of epistemic labour through time. More precisely, the central objective of the paper is to deliver a novel and plausible social account of knowledge-relevant responsi… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…However, it would be a mistake to think that the division of epistemic labour merely concerns the transmission of epistemic goods. This division can take place, for example, with regard to the epistemic norms or procedures that one exploits (De Brasi, 2015). 9 When considering the division of cognitive labour, the complexity of our dependence might become clearer.…”
Section: Expertise and The Epistemic Structure Of Societymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, it would be a mistake to think that the division of epistemic labour merely concerns the transmission of epistemic goods. This division can take place, for example, with regard to the epistemic norms or procedures that one exploits (De Brasi, 2015). 9 When considering the division of cognitive labour, the complexity of our dependence might become clearer.…”
Section: Expertise and The Epistemic Structure Of Societymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the division of epistemic labour not only concerns the transmission of epistemic goods, such as beliefs with positive epistemic status. For example, this division of labour often takes place with regard to the procedures for arriving at beliefs, say within science (since often one isn't aware of the rationale behind them and is implicitly trained to use them; De Brasi, 2015). By the division of cognitive labour, I mean the distribution of cognitive work across people to jointly perform a given epistemic task required for some positive epistemic status.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It can be, and it is (e.g. Aikin and Talisse, 2014;De Brasi, 2015a;Mercier and Sperber, 2017;Simon, 2015;Wagenknecht, 2017), much more pervasive. In fact, what we could ca l the e iste ic structure of society with its range of social and institutional ar angements, including (importantly for our purposes) its division of epistemic and cognitive labour, doesn't require the teaching of a l the facts to everyone and people thinking only on their own.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Having said that, it would be a mistake to think that the division of epistemic labour merely concerns the transmission of some epistemic good (more on this immediately below). This division can take place, for example, with regard to the epistemic norms or procedures that one exploits (De Brasi, 2015a). Nevertheless, below I'll focus on the (less controversial) knowledge-transmission aspect of the division of epistemic labour.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%