Necessary truth and proof

Read, Stephen

doi:10.1590/s0100-512x2010000100003

Cited by 20 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 6 publications

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“…On this point, see McDaniel (2005). For a very different approach, see Read (2010). Armstrong also had epistemological reasons for rejecting Platonism (SSM, 2).…”

Section: An Alternative Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

David Armstrong on the Metaphysics of Mathematics

Donaldson¹

2022

Dialectica

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This paper has two components. The first, longer component (sec. 1-6) is a critical exposition of Armstrong's views about the metaphysics of mathematics, as they are presented in Truth and Truthmakers and Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. In particular, I discuss Armstrong's views about the nature of the cardinal numbers, and his account of how modal truths are made true. In the second component of the paper (sec. 7), which is shorter and more tentative, I sketch an alternative account of the metaphysics of mathematics. I suggest we insist that mathematical truths have physical truthmakers, without insisting that mathematical objects themselves are part of the physical world.

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“…On this point, see McDaniel (2005). For a very different approach, see Read (2010). Armstrong also had epistemological reasons for rejecting Platonism (SSM, 2).…”

Section: An Alternative Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

David Armstrong on the Metaphysics of Mathematics

Donaldson¹

2022

Dialectica

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Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox

Brendel

2018

Synthese

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Logic and Information

Mares

2024

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This Element looks at two projects that relate logic and information: the project of using logic to integrate, manipulate and interpret information and the proect of using the notion of information to provide interpretations of logical systems. The Element defines 'information' in a manner that includes misinformation and disinformation and uses this general concept of information to provide an interpretation of various paraconsistent and relevant logics. It also integrates these logics into contemporary theories of informational updating, probability theory and (rather informally) some ideas from the theory of the complexity of proofs. The Element assumes some prior knowledge of modal logic and its possible world semantics, but all the other necessary background is provided.

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Necessary truth and proof

Cited by 20 publications

References 6 publications

David Armstrong on the Metaphysics of Mathematics

David Armstrong on the Metaphysics of Mathematics

Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox

Logic and Information

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