Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox

Brendel, Elke

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01980-2

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Finally, the contribution of Elke Brendel adds to the above mentioned discussions of epistemological questions and questions of philosophy of science surrounding truth, namely truth-tracking and truthlikeness, a logical and metaphysical perspective by discussing "Truthmaker Maximalism and the Truthmaker Paradox" (Brendel 2018). In her contribution, Elke argues against the view of Milne (2013) that truthmaker maximalism, the position that each truth has a truthmaker, can be refuted on mere logical grounds.…”

Section: The Problem Of Verisimilitude and Truthlikenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition”

et al. 2019

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This special issue of Synthese is in honor of Gerhard Schurz, our good friend and colleague, who contributed to philosophy in a multitude of novel and interesting ways. The idea to do such a special issue was born at a symposium on the occasion of Gerhard's 60th birthday back then in 2016. As a fun fact, the final publication of the special issue in print might be quite close to his 65th birthday in 2021. So in some sense this special issue can be expected to kill two birds with one stone. Let us start this introduction with a few words on Gerhard's life and work and on the guest editors' own relationship to him. We then zoom in and will say more about this special issue, followed by a brief description of its content.

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Section: The Problem Of Verisimilitude and Truthlikenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition”

et al. 2019

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“…8 Barrio and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015) have suggested that there is no reason that maximalists should accept these sorts of biconditionals. However, Brendel (2020Brendel ( : 1654 has recently shown how biconditionals of this form can be obtained with minimal means via diagonalization when a truthmaker predicate is added to Robinson arithmetic. Using this method, one can obtain ' Q+ M ≡ $Tm(˹M˺) I do not replicate Brendel's treatment here, but the proof can be appropriately modified to do so.…”

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confidence: 99%

Not every truth could have a truthmaker

Stigall

2022

Theoria

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Mark Jago argues for truthmaker maximalism in some recent papers based on a key premise: that every truth could have a truthmaker. Jago contends that many would pretheoretically accept this principle and that counterexamples to it would be difficult to find. In this note, I show how truthmaker non-maximalists can use a modified version of Milne's argument against maximalism to provide a counterexample to this key premise.

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Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox

Cited by 2 publications

References 18 publications

Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition”

Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition”

Not every truth could have a truthmaker

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