Endividamento em firmas com alta propensão à expropriação: o caso de firmas com um controlador

Abstract

O mercado brasileiro caracteriza-se por estruturas de propriedade concentradas, em um ambiente legal propício à expropriação de minoritários, o que pode influenciar os incentivos aos decisores e, potencialmente, afetar a decisão sobre a utilização de dívida como forma de financiamento das empresas. Este trabalho buscou estudar o nível de endividamento em empresas controladas por um único acionista, aqui classificadas como empresas com alta propensão à expropriação de minoritários, em uma amostra de 322 empresas negociadas na Bovespa entre 1996 e 2002. Os resultados apontaram um menor nível de endividamento dessas empresas, de forma consistente com a hipótese de maior poder de monitoração dos credores. Por outro lado, o seu nível de endividamento aumenta quando decresce o direito dos majoritários aos fluxos de caixa gerados, o que sinaliza para a utilização da dívida como mecanismo de governança.

Assessing accounting for citizenship: an empirical analysis of the corporate control and capital structure decisions

“…However, La Porta et al (1999) and Van den Berghe and Carchon (2003), among others, point out the large amount of publicly traded corporations that also have concentrated control. The same scenario is also found in Brazil by Dami et al (2007), Leal et al (2002) and Soares and Kloeckner (2008).…”

“…• Siqueira (1998): based on the classification of Thomsen and Pedersen (1997) • La Porta et al (1999): control is defined as the citizen/investor who owns 20% of the shares with voting rights, directly or indirectly • Valadares and Leal (2000): direct and indirect investors with over 50% of the voting capital • Leal et al (2002): no specific percentage to measure the direct and indirect control • Anderson and Reeb (2003): the percentage of capital of the CEO and founding family members • Dami et al (2007): classified as dispersed ownership: up to 20% of the shares with voting rights, directly or indirectly; dominant control: between 20% and 50% of the shares with voting rights, directly or indirectly; and majority control: over 50% of the shares with voting rights, directly or indirectly • Soares and Kloeckner (2008): define control as over 50% of the shares with voting rights, directly or indirectly (three different criteria).…”

“…Among the definitions, this research will adopt the majority control definition by Thomsen and Pedersen (1997), used by Siqueira (1998) and later by Soares and Kloeckner (2008), according to which a corporation with concentrated control is one that has one investor or legal entity that owns more than 50% of the shares of the corporation directly or indirectly. In this research, a second classification, based on the research of Dami et al (2007), Siqueira (1998) and Thomsen and Pedersen (1997), considers majority control in corporations with investors who own between 20% and 50% of the shares with voting rights.…”

“…Furthermore, the research of Soares and Kloeckner (2008) details corporations with these statements. They point out Brazil as an environment that is conducive to expropriating wealth from minority investors in the borrowing environment, because of the concentration of control.…”

“…In Brazil, the study by Schnorrenberger and Procianoy (2004) shows that companies with controlling shareholders are more averse to debt. Soares and Kloeckner (2008), however, develop studies that show that in certain situations, companies with a defined controller may be more indebted, and when they have a single controller they tend to have difficulties in financing and be less indebted.…”