A inspeção do trabalho no Brasil

Abstract

A avaliação do efeito das instituições trabalhistas sobre o funcionamento dos mercados de trabalho e da economia como um todo ganhou importância renovada nos últimos dez ou quinze anos na América Latina. Uma visão em particular tornou-se hegemônica entre nós, recomendando políticas invariavelmente favoráveis à flexibilização das leis trabalhistas, com o propósito de reativar o crescimento econômico, aumentar a produtividade das empresas e a competitividade dos países latino-americanos e, dessa maneira, facilitar sua adaptação 451 * Este trabalho resulta de projeto comparativo internacional coordenado por Graciela Bensusán (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana -UAM, México) e financiado pelo Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología -CONACYT e pelo Conselho Nacional

Workforce Composition, Productivity, and Labor Regulations in a Compensating Differentials Theory of Informality

“…16 Other indicators, such as total revenues from nes, also increased during the period. For a thorough discussion of enforcement of labor regulation in Brazil, see Cardoso and Lage (2005).…”

‘For the English to see’ or effective change? How supply chains are shaped by laws and regulations, and what that means for the exposure of modern slavery

“…The non-compliance with sanitary, environmental, and labour laws have their individual sanctions regimes. The labour law sanctions are of little value, especially when compared to the companies' income (Lage & Cardoso 2005). Non-compliance with sanitary requirements is punished with the suspension of international certification for export and can temporarily shut down operations, which results in a substantial financial loss for a large exporter.…”

Resilience and Renewal: The Enforcement of Labor Laws in Brazil

“…Based on this information, the office plans oper-LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 59: 2 c. Workers freed from conditions analogous to slavery ations carefully (to the level of estimating the amount of fuel needed to drive inspectors to the site) so that inspectors can reach the greatest number of undeclared workers at the lowest possible cost. The effect of these policies, clear metrics, and associated incentives is visible in the increase in inspector productivity (Cardoso and Lage 2005). Even though the number of inspectors has remained relatively stable over time (around an average of 3,000 inspectors; MTE 2008, 2013a), the total number of workers reached during wage and hour inspections has more than doubled, from 15.9 million in 1995 to 34.2 million workers in 2011 (see figure 4).…”

“…In some instances, the laws protecting collective labor rights did not keep up with the novel economic realities of outsourced, decentralized, and dispersed production (Anner 2008(Anner , 2011a. In other instances, governments failed to enforce the individual and collective labor laws they had retained on the books (Cardoso and Lage 2005;Bensusán 2006;Cook 2007;Murillo and Levitsky 2013;Kanbur and Ronconi 2016). This phenomenon of covert deregulation came to be known as de facto flexibility.…”