2015
DOI: 10.1590/1981-38212014000200006
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The Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers in Four Presidential Elections (2002–2014)

Abstract: This research note examines the electoral impacts of Conditional Cash Transfer programs in the 2014 presidential election, and compares these to results previously obtained for the preceding three elections (ZUCCO, 2013). It analyzes both individual-level survey data and municipal-level electoral data and applies different matching techniques to attempt to ensure that only similar individuals and municipalities are compared to each other. The note shows that although the strictly defined "electoral effect" of … Show more

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Cited by 26 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…In particular, political leaders may use social policy in order to strengthen their rule. In democratic regimes, social benefits can be a tool to gain or reward voters [45] , [46] , [47] , [48] . Autocracies may use transfers to mitigate social unrest by increasing the standard of living of the poor or they may channel benefits to their supporters [49] , [50] , [51] .…”
Section: Research Agendamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In particular, political leaders may use social policy in order to strengthen their rule. In democratic regimes, social benefits can be a tool to gain or reward voters [45] , [46] , [47] , [48] . Autocracies may use transfers to mitigate social unrest by increasing the standard of living of the poor or they may channel benefits to their supporters [49] , [50] , [51] .…”
Section: Research Agendamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another example is the change of targeting of cash transfers to children in Mongolia from means-tested to universal benefits on the basis of the new government's socialist values (Farrington and Slater 2006). In addition, a growing literature addresses clientelism and vote buying in social policy, where social benefits and public goods are strategically used to increase popularity among the masses and gain or reward voters (De La O 2013;Manacorda et al 2011;Nupia 2011;Zucco 2015). We contribute to this literature by arguing that political regime type may have an effect on the initiation of social transfer programmes in developing countries.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…A extrapolação dos resultados, porém, sugere que a presidente teria recebido votações expressivas nos locais mais pobres, mesmo sem o programa" (O Estado de São Paulo, 13/10/2014, p. A8). Em trabalho posterior, o autor (Zucco, 2015) desenvolve e amplia essa compreensão sinalizando para um importante efeito do PBF inclusive entre eleitores que não recebem o benefício.…”
Section: Matérias Em 2013unclassified