Making sense of the subjective experience of others

Abstract

In this article, we address some conceptual issues that are logically prior to the constitution of any psychopathology. We explore ontological and epistemological aspects of subjective experience, rejecting both Cartesianism and behaviorism, and favoring the Wittgensteinian notion of criterial support instead. Then, we discuss the disanalogy between knowledge of other minds and our knowledge of anything else. Based on the arguments by Eilan’s that the “communication claim” should replace the “observation claim,” we defend that there is a kind of knowledge that is irreducibly founded on intersubjectivity (that is, knowledge of persons is knowledge for two) and point out to implications it may have for psychopathology.

A psicopatologia sob a perspectiva do sujeito singular

“…Esse estado de coisas constitui um paradoxo, talvez até mesmo uma contradição: a psicopatologia é a disciplina nuclear (Banzato & Zorzanelli, 2020) não apenas do campo da psiquiatria, mas também fundamento de todas as práticas clínicas do campo da chamada "saúde mental". Dela depende a delimitação do elemento mórbido em jogo, do mal a ser tratado e, por extensão, da direção e dos objetivos do tratamento.…”

Psychopathology from the perspective of the singular subject

“…This brings about a paradox, perhaps even a contradiction: psychopathology is the core discipline (Banzato & Zorzanelli, 2020) not only of the field of psychiatry, but also the foundation of all clinical practices in the field of "mental health". On it depends the delimitation of the morbid element at play, of the evil to be treated and, consequently, of the direction and the objectives of the treatment.…”