Challenging the Grounding Objection to Presentism

Abstract

The grounding objection to presentism rests on two premises: (i) every true proposition P has a truthmaker T, and (ii) some claims about the future and past are obviously true. However, if the future and past do not exist, there can be no truthmakers for future and past tensed expressions. Presentists tend not to challenge the premises of the objection. Instead they argue that the present contains all the truthmakers we need. Presentists should challenge the premises instead. First, finding truthmakers in the present only results in the postulation of implausible and/or ethereal entities that ultimately fail to solve the grounding objection. Second, no manifestly absurd consequences follow from accepting the lack of truth-values for tensed expressions. Third, the grounding objection does not just require the assumption that for every truth there is a truthmaker, but also that for every truthmaker there is a truth. I show how one can deny the latter without denying the former. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 88 Rognvaldur IngthorssonManuscrito -Rev.

A new grounding problem for presentism

“…For other criticisms of nomic presentism in the context of the classical grounding problem, seeKierland (2013) andIngthorsson (2017).…”