Kit Fine on Tense and Reality

Savitt, Steven F.

doi:10.1590/0100-6045.2016.v39n4.ss

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 17 publications

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“…2 In their (2011), Correia and Rosenkranz use the label absolutist anti-recurrentism for this view. 3 For critical discussion of Fine's argument, see Deng (2012), Tallant (2013), Cameron (2015: 86-102), Lipman (2015), Savitt (2016), Loss (2017Loss ( , 2018, and Deasy (2018). 4 Cf.…”

Section: Fine's Mctaggart and Dynamic Absolutismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic absolutism and qualitative change

Eker

2020

Philos Stud

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According to Fine's (Modality and tense: philosophical papers. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 261-320, 2005) famous take on the infamous McTaggartian paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Correia and Rosenkranz (As time goes by: eternal facts in an ageing universe. Mentis, Paderborn, 2011) have recently objected that Fine's argument depends on a crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up, they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic absolutism, is to be preferred over its rivals. I argue in this paper that dynamic absolutism does not constitute a genuine alternative for realists about tense.

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Section: Fine's Mctaggart and Dynamic Absolutismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic absolutism and qualitative change

Eker

2020

Philos Stud

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The a-theory of time, temporal passage, and comprehensiveness

Eker

2022

Synthese

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It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view’s failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage.

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