Novo olhar ao board interlocking: evidências a partir das redes sociais corporativas

Abstract

Th e study aims to evaluate the interconnection structures by members of the Board of Directors with political and fi nancial expertise of companies listed in the Brazilian stock market B3. Th e sample consisted of 2,474 observations in the period from 2010 to 2015. It is suggested by the Agency Th eory that board interlocking (BI) for fi nancial expertise can help in corporate monitoring and mitigates the agency's confl icts. On the other hand, BI by political expertise can maximize opportunistic behavior. In the view of Resource Dependency Th eory, BI for fi nancial expertise can assist companies in attracting fi nancial resources, while BI for policy expertise can maximize results through more lucrative contracts and advantages off ered by policymakers. It is concluded that the systematization of BI by diff erent expertise can be used in future research to explain corporate strategies, decisions, and phenomena, as well as to evaluate the causes and eff ects of such structures in the management of organizations.

The effect of social ties between the CEO and board of directors and fiscal council's members on earnings management

“…Studies on social relations (Barro and Colauto, 2019; Dal Magro and Klann, 2020; Ferris et al. , 2020) have already shown a dense network of ties among individuals on Brazilian boards.…”

“…First, we address a non-formal dimension of governance when discussing social ties. There is little evidence concerning the influence of social ties on accounting information disclosure processes (Dal Magro and Klann, 2020; Faleye et al. , 2011; Krishnan et al.…”

“…First, we address a non-formal dimension of governance when discussing social ties. There is little evidence concerning the influence of social ties on accounting information disclosure processes (Dal Magro and Klann, 2020;Faleye et al, 2011;Krishnan et al, 2011). Previous studies have explored the tie between CEO and directors from the agency theory perspective (Dimitrova, 2017;Krishnan et al, 2011;Park, 2021), limiting themselves to the board's monitoring role and considering aspects of independence (Hoitash, 2011;Hoitash and Mkrtchyan, 2022) and duality (Hwang and Kim, 2009) as factors that encompass this role.…”

“…Studies on social relations (Barro and Colauto, 2019;Dal Magro and Klann, 2020) amongst the boards of Brazilian companies have already shown a dense network in relation to the connections between the individuals who make up the boards. The study by Locatelli et al (2021) provides evidence that in 93.22% of Brazilian companies, the CEO is socially connected…”

Conselhos de administração e board interlocking entre as empresas listadas no nível 1 de governança corporativa da B3

“…Estudos sobre BI têm sido realizados há décadas no âmbito da GC, evidenciando suas contradições, limitações e possibilidades (FICH;WHITE, 2005;PICCOLI, 2017). A literatura mais recente aborda aspectos como a ocorrência do BI em setores específicos da indústria, buscando entender suas especificidades (BUEREN;DANI, BECK, 2014), a relação entre o BI e as práticas de suavização de resultados (RIBEIRO; COLAUTO, 2016), a influência do BI na performance, nos lucros e no gerenciamento de resultados das empresas (DAL VESCO;BEUREN, 2016;PICCOLI, 2017;LUNARDI;BARBOSA;CUNHA, 2019), as características e a diversidade na composição dos conselhos de administração (FRAGA;SILVA, 2012;NISIYAMA;NAKAMURA, 2018;GOMES;VICENTE, 2019;LAZZARETTI;PIEKAS;JULKOVSKI, 2019) e os reflexos de expertises financeira e política dos conselheiros (MAGRO; KLANN, 2020).…”