“…For instance, following Arrow (1959), allowance of patents and other intellectual property rights repeals from maintaining effective competition, for a limited period of time and under specific terms and conditions, in order to efficiently remunerate specific investments that develop welfareimproving R&D activities and resources. In the same spirit, accountingbased regulatory control of excessive rentability and price-making frames and shapes the competitive pricing in order to assure the proper functioning of the industrial system for public interest purposes.…”
Section: Beyond a Market-based Perspective: Featuring Facts About Telmentioning
“…For instance, following Arrow (1959), allowance of patents and other intellectual property rights repeals from maintaining effective competition, for a limited period of time and under specific terms and conditions, in order to efficiently remunerate specific investments that develop welfareimproving R&D activities and resources. In the same spirit, accountingbased regulatory control of excessive rentability and price-making frames and shapes the competitive pricing in order to assure the proper functioning of the industrial system for public interest purposes.…”
Section: Beyond a Market-based Perspective: Featuring Facts About Telmentioning
“…Note that the trajectory through (ĉ,û (1) ) goes to the left, and that through (ĉ,û (2) ) goes to the right. As Π ĉ,û (1) = Π ĉ,û (2) , it follows that |û (1) − 1| = |û (2) − 1|.…”
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, Vol. 78,No. 5) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal solution as well as initial marginal cost levels that exceed the choke price. Firms that collude develop further a wider range of initial technologies, pursue innovations more quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion could thus yield higher total surplus.
“…Arrow (1962) favored competition to foster innovations while Gilbert and Newbery (1982) suggested that a monopolist with the threat of entry from prospective competitors has more incentives to innovate preemptively. Tirole (1997) called these two forces "the replacement effect" and "the efficiency effect," respectively.…”
Section: Competition Among Mobile Network Operators and Their Investmmentioning
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