1. Einleitende Überlegungen zum Programm der Wissenschaft der Logik

Teleology and Basic Actions: A reading of the chapter on Teleology in Hegel's Subjective Logic in the terms of action theory

“… 3 See for example Franco Chiereghin: ‘As is evident from the essential features of the teleological relationship […] what Hegel took as a model for the elaboration of the “teleology” section is mainly the technical-practical human action’ (1990: 185; my translation); Friederike Schick: ‘The chapter on teleology deals with the relationship of external purposefulness, the realisation of a purpose on and with the help of non-living natural objects’ (1994: 266; my translation); Tommaso Pierini: ‘Through technology, self-determined identity is related to externality and shows freedom a side of external determination. Furthermore, through technology, purposeful actions are bound to nature, are also initially in contradiction to it.…”

Double Shine: Hegel's Logical Theory of Concept

“…Both identify the core issue that the double shine addresses as the compatibility between the universal's ‘universality’ or ‘self-reference’ and its ‘determinacy’ (Schick 1994: 197, 202; Iber 2002: 192). The outward shine represents such determinacy in terms of ‘the relation to the other’ through the abstraction from the ‘particular perspective’, the ‘externally selective reception’ and the ‘comparison with the third’ (Schick 1994: 199; Iber 2002: 192). Because of this otherness, determinacy under the outward shine contradicts the universal's self-reference.…”

“…‘Being determinate prevents the thing from being itself’. ‘The true universal seems consequently only to be achieved through the abstract negation of determinacy’ (Schick 1994: 199).…”

“…In addition, the two methods oppose each other. One employs a type of ‘ genus-character ’, a ‘self-determination’ (Schick 1994: 199) or ‘self-specification’ (Iber 2002: 192) of the universal, while the other employs ‘the-one-concept’ (Schick 1994: 200; Iber 2002: 192) or ‘the highest universal’ (Schick 1994: 202) abstracted from the species universals. The highest universal as a ‘simple negation of all particular universals’ (Schick 1994: 199) eventually becomes an ‘indifference against all difference’ (Schick 1994: 202) or ‘indifference and indeterminacy against all determinate concepts’ (Iber 2002: 193).…”

“…One employs a type of ‘ genus-character ’, a ‘self-determination’ (Schick 1994: 199) or ‘self-specification’ (Iber 2002: 192) of the universal, while the other employs ‘the-one-concept’ (Schick 1994: 200; Iber 2002: 192) or ‘the highest universal’ (Schick 1994: 202) abstracted from the species universals. The highest universal as a ‘simple negation of all particular universals’ (Schick 1994: 199) eventually becomes an ‘indifference against all difference’ (Schick 1994: 202) or ‘indifference and indeterminacy against all determinate concepts’ (Iber 2002: 193). However, it is unclear what the difference is between this latter abstract way of understanding the inward shine and the abstract negation of the determinacy in the outward shine, as both lead to an indeterminate highest universal.…”