It is maintained that a classification or taxonomy of functions is required to reflect cognitive functions. On the basis of the epistemological position of a pragmatic monism, it can be stated that cognitive functions are evolutionary products, and furthermore that their availability is dependent on the structural and operational integrity of neural modules and networks. Loss of functions as a consequence of local injuries or the disruption of neural networks can be used to develop a catalog of functions. The logic is as follows: the loss of a function is a proof of its existence. On a general level, two complementary domains of functions are distinguished in this taxonomy. The first domain consists of those functions that represent the content of subjective phenomena, such as percepts in different modalities, memories, emotions, volitions, intentions, or speech acts (the “what”). The second consists of those functions that make conscious content possible as a necessary condition, such as activation (being modulated for instance by the circadian rhythm), the temporal control of functions (on different time‐scales using distinct neural algorithms), or attentional mechanisms (for instance spatial attention under endogenous or exogenous control), and we refer to these functions as logistic functions (the “how”). Complementarity as a generative principle is a prime characteristic of this taxonomy with both content and logistic functions.

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This is the claim: Human knowledge expresses itself in three different modes: explicit, implicit, and sensory (e.g., visual) knowledge. The reference to knowledge as explicit knowledge only (as it is usually done) neglects the other modes of knowledge. Instead of using the noun “knowledge,” it is suggested that we use “knowing” as a term to stress the active mode in cognition. The three modes of knowing are reflected in different mechanisms of cognitive and neural processing; these can already be observed in classical documents of humankind. This unity of the different modes of knowing can also be extracted from cultural artifacts such as poetry. Although possessing different characteristics, the three modes of knowing are related to each other in a complementary way, thus providing an integrative network for cognition. We suggest that a unifying frame of the modes of knowing lies in aesthetic principles. These different modes of knowing with their unifying frame reflect some general features of cognition. We stress that basic concepts in “artificial or machine intelligence” do not match at all human modes of knowing.

Background. The problem of polysemy has attracted scholars' attention since antiquity and interest in the phenomenon never lessens. A substantial number of works have been published on the cognitive nature of meaning ambiguity. Despite a new emphasis on the cognitive aspects of polysemy, little has been done towards an integrated approach to the study of this linguistic phenomenon. objective and method. This work's objective was to contribute to an integrated interdisciplinary theory of polysemy. To this end, we explored the cognitive foundation of meaning using empirical and theoretical research methods, but mostly relying on semiotic analysis of texts central to the humanities. In particular, we analyzed the dichotomy of conscious vs. unconscious processing in the acquisition and use of polysemy. For the identification of cognitive patterns of polysemy development in ontogenesis, we used probabilistic conceptual modeling. Results. The acquisition of meaning is a conscious process: it is a conscious interaction of the speaker with an interlocutor and their common social environment. On the other hand, meanings are unconscious unless a connection between the phonological, acoustic form and the concept is established. Correspondingly, polysemy is conscious when a new meaning is formed in the course of social interaction. However, polysemy, as an inherent language phenomenon, remains unconscious for native speakers, who are unaware of its presence provided they are not involved in some form of intentional language games (pun, zeugma or intended ambiguity). conclusion. The present approach to the analysis of meaning ambiguity seems to be a productive endeavor. Further research into polysemy has to be based on a range of additional types of evidence, including those obtained by methods of cognitive neuro science.

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