The aim of our study was to explore psychological determinants of COVID-19 responsible behavior. We focused on trait anxiety and worry about the corona crisis, knowledge and unfounded beliefs about coronavirus and thinking dispositions (cognitive reflection, actively open-minded thinking, faith in intuition and science curiosity) that should drive knowledge and beliefs. Additionally, we tested the effectiveness of a one-shot intervention based on the "consider counter-arguments" debiasing technique in changing COVID-19 unfounded beliefs. We used a convenience sample of 1439 participants who filled in the questionnaire on-line. Comparison of latent means showed that the "consider counter-arguments" intervention did not affect unfounded beliefs. Structural equation model, conducted on 962 participants with data on all variables, indicated that greater worry and weaker endorsement of COVID-19 unfounded beliefs lead to more responsible COVID-19 behavior. The relationship of trait anxiety and thinking dispositions with the criterion was mediated through the worry about COVID-19 and unfounded beliefs about COVID-19, respectively.

No abstract

The aim of our study was to explore psychological determinants of COVID-19 responsible behavior. We focused on trait anxiety and worry about the corona crisis, and knowledge/unfounded beliefs about coronavirus and thinking dispositions (cognitive reflection, actively open-minded thinking, faith in intuition and science curiosity) that should drive knowledge/beliefs. Additionally, we tested the effectiveness of a one-shot intervention based on the “consider-the-opposite” debiasing technique in changing COVID-19 unfounded beliefs. We used a convenience sample of 1439 participants who filled in the questionnaire on-line. Comparison of latent means showed that the “consider-the-opposite” intervention did not affect unfounded beliefs. Structural equation model, conducted on 880 participants with data on all variables, indicated that greater worry and weaker endorsement of COVID-19 unfounded beliefs lead to more responsible COVID-19 behavior. The relationship of trait anxiety and thinking dispositions with the criterion was mediated through the worry about COVID-19 and unfounded beliefs about COVID-19, respectively.

The Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT‐A) is based on the idea that aggressive individuals use motive‐based cognitive biases to see their behavior as reasonable and that those biases can be measured with inductive reasoning tasks. Although the initial validation efforts for the CRT‐A in the United States have been reasonably successful, there has been no attempt to determine if the evidence of validity and reliability generalizes to other cultural contexts. In this paper, we describe four studies designed to systematically accumulate validity evidence for the CRT‐A using Croatian participants. Our analyses revealed that the Croatian adaptation of the CRT‐A yielded psychometric characteristics that were similar to those obtained on the US samples (Study 1). CRT‐A scores that predicted counterproductive work behaviors occurrence beyond self‐reported personality (Study 2) were independent from general mental ability as measured with an abstract reasoning test (Study 3), and not susceptible to faking (Study 4).

Although it is generally acknowledged that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) captures intelligence and numerical ability, many agree that it cannot be completely reduced to these constructs. Rather, it is presumed that the CRT also assesses some kind of thinking disposition towards reflective and open-minded thinking. In this manuscript, we report the results of a study that tested this assumption by exploring convergent validity of both the numerical and verbal version of the CRT. Using structural equation modelling, we investigated whether intelligence and numerical ability can account for all the variance in the CRT and if not, what is the nature of the unaccounted variance. Our conclusions about the convergent validity differed for the two types of test. For the numerical CRT, we found that the correlation between the latent numerical CRT and numerical ability was so high that the constructs were practically indistinguishable. As for the verbal CRT, the correlations between the latent verbal CRT and intelligence and numerical ability constructs were substantially lower, meaning that these two constructs do not account for all the variance in the test. However, the latent verbal CRT failed to correlate with belief bias and actively open-minded thinking, two closely related constructs, once the variance of intelligence and numerical ability was partialled out. We concluded that, despite its name, the CRT does not seem to assess the construct of cognitive reflection and its correlation with other variables found in the literature might mostly be driven by its overlap with intelligence and numerical ability.