Purpose This study aims to examine the impact of aggregate and individual corporate governance provisions on firm performance on all firms listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) for the period between 2011 and 2015. In addition, it disentangles ownership structure provision to ownership concentration and foreign ownership and investigates which component of ownership structure stands behind the significance of ownership structure in explaining firm performance. Design/methodology/approach The study uses multiple linear regression models to analyze the relationship between aggregate corporate governance index and its provisions and firm performance. A corporate governance index is built on the basis of four mechanics (i.e. board of directors, audit, disclosure and ownership structure) for all firms listed at DSE. On the other hand, the dependent variable (firm performance) is measured using Earnings Per Share (EPS) and Return On Assets (ROA). The authors capture current war conditions using political stability and absence of violence indicator, one of Worldwide Governance Indicators accumulated by the World bank. Findings This study finds that ownership structure is the only significant corporate governance provision in determining Syrian firms’ performance, as it loads positively and significantly on firm performance proxies (ROA and EPS). Moreover, the analysis of ownership structure items shows that foreign ownership is the main source of this positive and significant impact. This result is robust for both measures of firm performance and in the presence of political stability indicator. Originality/value This paper provides evidence on corporate governance measures from Syrian Arab Republic, a developing country with an emerging stock exchange. It examines board structure, ownership structure, audit committee and disclosure in a period of crisis because of the war in this country. Moreover, it uncovers that foreign ownership is the only influential provision affecting firm performance at DSE. Furthermore, it combines firm-level governance indicators with country governance indicator of political stability and absence of violence.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management. Design/methodology/approach This study applies ordinary least squares estimates on fixed-time effects panel regression model to test the impact of the investigated variables on earnings management for the whole population of banks and insurance companies listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) during the period from 2011 to 2018. Findings The empirical evidence suggests a negative non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (as proxied by board of directors’ ownership) on earnings management. However, neither audit quality nor the simultaneous effect of the managerial ownership and audit quality (Big 4) affects earnings management. Research limitations/implications DSE is dominated by the financial sector and the number of observations is constrained by the recent establishment of DSE and the small number of firms listed at DSE. In addition, the non-availability of data on executive directors’ and foreign ownerships restrict our ability to uncover the impact of different dimensions of ownership structure on earnings management. Practical implications First, it stimulates investors to purchase stocks in financial firms that enjoy both high managerial ownership, as they seem enjoying higher earnings quality. Second, the findings encourage external auditors to consider the ownership structure when choosing their clients as the financial statements’ quality is affected by this structure. Third, researchers may need to consider the role of managerial ownership when analyzing the determinants of earnings management. Originality/value It fills the gap in the literature, as it investigates the impact of both managerial ownership and audit quality on earnings management in a special conflict context and in an unexplored emerging market of DSE. It suggests that managerial ownership exerts a significant role in controlling earnings management practices when loose regulatory environment combines conflict conditions. However, external audit quality fails to counter earnings management practices when conditions are fierce.