Prior literature has shown that, for a symmetric information setting, supplier encroachment into a reseller's market can mitigate double marginalization and benefit both the supplier and the reseller. This paper extends the investigation of supplier encroachment to the environment where the reseller might be better informed than the supplier. We find that the launch of the supplier's direct channel can result in costly signaling behavior on the part of the reseller, in which he reduces his order quantity when the market size is small. Such a downward order distortion can amplify double marginalization. As a result, in addition to the “win–win” and “win–lose” outcomes for the supplier and the reseller, supplier encroachment can also lead to “lose–lose” and “lose–win” outcomes, particularly when the reseller has a significant efficiency advantage in the selling process and the prior probability of a large market is low. We further explore the implications of those findings for information management in supply chains. Complementing the conventional understanding, we show that with the ability to encroach, the supplier may prefer to sell to either a better informed or an uninformed reseller in different scenarios. On the other hand, as a result of a supplier developing encroachment capability, a reseller either may choose not to develop an advanced informational capability or may become more willing to find a means of credibly sharing his information. This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management.
Social media platform owners often choose to provide tighter integration with their own complementary applications (i.e., first-party applications) as compared to that with other complementary third-party applications. We study the impact of such integration on consumer demand for first-party applications and competing third-party applications by exploring Facebook’s integration of Instagram, an application in its photo-sharing application ecosystem. We find that consumers obtain additional value from Instagram after its integration with Facebook, leading to a large increase in the use of Instagram for Facebook photo sharing. Further, we find that the growth of Instagram’s user base has a positive spillover effect on big third-party applications and a negative spillover effect on small third-party applications in Facebook’s photo-sharing ecosystem. As a result, while small third-party applications face reduced demand after integration, big third-party applications experience a small increase in demand. Thus, the overall demand for the entire photo-sharing application ecosystem actually increases, which suggests that Facebook’s integration strategy benefits the complementary market overall. Our results highlight the role of platform integration for first-party applications and the application ecosystem overall, and they have implications for strategic management of first-party applications in the presence of third-party applications. This paper was accepted by Anandhi Bharadwaj, information systems.
T he objective of this study was to extend existing understanding of supplier encroachment to contexts in which there is information asymmetry and the supplier can use nonlinear pricing. Prior research has shown that supplier encroachment can mitigate double marginalization and thus benefit both the supplier and the reseller. However, under symmetric information, this benefit disappears if the supplier can use nonlinear pricing. In our model, the reseller observes the true market size while the supplier knows only the prior distribution, that is, a seemingly ideal setting for implementing mechanism design through nonlinear pricing. We first show that, because encroachment capability enables the supplier to make an ex post output decision, it fundamentally alters the structure of the optimal nonlinear pricing policy. In addition to the usual downward distortion effect, where the reseller may purchase less than the efficient quantity, we also have the possibility for upward distortion. Thus, under asymmetric information and nonlinear pricing, supplier encroachment has two opposing effects. On one hand, the ability to shift sales to the direct channel allows the supplier to reduce information rents with less sacrifice of efficiency; but on the other hand, by introducing the possibility of her own opportunistic behavior, it can result in upward distortion of the quantities sold through the reselling channel, which is a new source of inefficiency. Depending upon the relative efficiency of the reselling channel and the demand distribution, either of these two effects may dominate and the supplier's ability to encroach may either benefit or hurt both the supplier and the reseller.
The development of e‐commerce has greatly facilitated the practice that suppliers encroach upon the retail realm of downstream retailers through direct channels (e.g., online stores). The literature in this area has investigated profit‐maximizing firms, but the role of other organizational structures is not well understood. This study studies supplier encroachment in which the retailer is a dual‐purpose corporation that pursues his own profit as well as consumer surplus. We find that the retailer's pursuit of consumer surplus can not only intensify market competition and thus reducing the margin of direct selling, but also motivate the encroaching supplier to set a higher wholesale price compared with the case of no encroachment. The presence of a dual‐purpose retailer reduces the effectiveness of using the wholesale price as a lever by the supplier. Therefore, encroaching upon a dual‐purpose retailer can hurt the supplier. We examine whether a retailer can benefit from being a dual‐purpose corporation and how the retailer's dual objectives affect consumer surplus. Interestingly, a dual‐purpose retailer can earn a higher profit than a for‐profit retailer as the dual‐purpose structure helps deter encroachment (i.e., doing well by doing good). Also, consumer surplus in the case of a dual‐purpose retailer can be lower than that with a for‐profit retailer. This is because the commitment to be a dual‐purpose retailer reduces supplier encroachment and thus reduces the total quantity sold to consumers.
C rowdfunding, a peer-to-peer fundraising mechanism, solicits capital from individual backers to support entrepreneurial projects. Entrepreneurs set a funding target and deadline; the project will be funded only if it reaches this funding target by the deadline. Backers individually decide whether to contribute, but their total contributions collectively determine whether the project will be successfully funded. This study models the dynamics of backers' contributions in the presence of success uncertainty and analyzes managerial promotion strategies to maximize the likelihood of funding success. Two opposing forces affect backer decisions: backers are more likely to back a project that has already reached a greater fraction of its funding goal (positive externalities), but the backing propensity declines over time (negative deadline effects). These two competing forces give rise to a time-dependent critical threshold of funding that a project must attain to achieve successful funding. We evaluate actionable promotion strategies (when to promote the project and how much promotion effort to spend) for entrepreneurs to dynamically manage their crowdfunding campaigns.
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