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Additional information:Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Capital account reform and short-and long-run stock price leadership AbstractThis paper studies the effect of capital account liberalization policies on the price discovery of crosslistings in Chinese stocks. We construct a non-linear causality framework that decomposes shortand long-run dimensions of price leadership. Our analysis shows that capital account liberalization has had a profound effect on long-run A-and H-price leadership traits. Specifically, increased inward capital movement from Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) strengthens longterm leadership in the mainland A-market. Similarly, increased capital outflow from the Chinese mainland galvanizes long-term price discovery processes in the Hong Kong H-market. We thus offer strong evidence that capital account liberalization promotes stock market efficiency in the long-run. The present study's empirical account also suggests that such capital flows inhibit shortterm lead-lag effects.

Abstract. After "Five Water Governance", the garbage processing shows exponential growth in Zhejiang, which causes a paradox with the behindhand garbage disposal facilities and processing model. Incineration is the main way of garbage disposal nowadays, but the incineration causes NIMBY. We analyze the technology, economy, market and social characteristics of garbage to discover the deep reason about NIMBY. Based on above, we build a new processing model includes pricing, operation and supervision mechanism. At last, we give suggestions from the perspective on publicity, organization guarantee and system construction.

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