This article explores the challenges that Italy poses for existing analyses of western punishment. These ‘challenges’ are visible at the penal level and in relation to the variables used to explain contemporary penal trends. In this article I argue that Italian penality cannot be understood in terms of unequivocal ‘punitiveness’ or unequivocal ‘moderation’. Italian trends betray a co-existence and alternation of repression and leniency, whose incidence I trace in penal reform and legislation. I explore the issue of waning state sovereignty and its presumed contribution to increasing punitiveness, explaining why the evolution of the Italian state does not fit this narrative. I argue that Italy is a contested state, whose penal law can be sidelined by the informal norms with which it co-exists. I also ask whether Italian penality can be explained by reference to political economy. I argue that Italy’s hybrid political economy challenges the methodological approach that predicts punitiveness or moderation by reference to political economic evolution. I conclude by explaining why politics – political dynamics, institutions and culture – is the key organizing principle with which to systematize contemporary Italian penality. I argue that political dynamics should likewise be reconsidered by, and integrated into, existing analyses of western punishment.

Comparative analysis of violent crime is hampered by a lack of reliable statistics, even between relatively similar countries, with doubts about existing studies suggesting that further comparative data is needed. Violent crime presents particular problems of variation in offence definition and recording practices. We can, however, derive reasonably valid comparative data for the US and England and Wales for the narrower category of serious violent crime. We show broadly that the incidence of serious violent crime per capita is between three and seven times as high in the US as in England and Wales. This parallels the comparative data on homicide; existing comparisons with Canada and New Zealand lend further weight to the claim that levels of serious violence in the US are distinctively high.

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The article discusses the implications of the Eurozone crisis for Italian penality. It begins by analysing the 'politics of austerity' -the economic reforms and new political mode entrenched by the Eurozone crisis. It then reflects upon the penal implications of such changes, focusing on the conceptual links between state-citizen relations, political institutional arrangements, and punishment in Italy. The article argues that Italy will continue to display an alternation of punitiveness and moderation. However, the meaning and contours of both punitiveness and moderation are changing. Punitiveness is likely to be exacerbated, as punishment is used to impose cohesion on an ever more fragmented polity.Moderation, far from being a collective good and 'public philosophy', is likely to become a narrow, stratified and personalistic good. The article urges us to consider whether austerity may be engendering similar dynamics across other EU polities.

This chapter shows how reasonably valid comparative data for violent crime in the United States and England and Wales can be derived. Comparative analysis of violent crime is hampered by a lack of reliable statistics, even between relatively similar countries, with doubts about existing studies suggesting that further comparative data are needed. Violent crime presents particular problems of variation in offense definition and recording practices. However, the data for the United States and England and Wales can be derived for the narrower category of serious violent crime. The chapter shows broadly that the incidence of serious violent crime per capita is between three and seven times as high in the United States as in England and Wales. This parallels the comparative data on homicide; existing comparisons with Canada and New Zealand lend further weight to the claim that levels of serious violence in the United States are distinctively high.

Abstract:The article argues that punishment will vary depending on how political membership is constituted in different polities. This has significant implications for arguments that link contemporary Western punitiveness to 'anti-politics', understood here as a degradation of political membership. The article argues that the spread of 'anti-politics' and its penal implications will depend on how political membership is constituted in different polities and in their 'State'. It reaches this conclusion by exploring the way in which 'the State' appears in the literature on politics and punishment, and by adopting a re-worked definition of 'the State'. The Italian case study is then used to demonstrate both the link between punishment and political membership, and the need to contextualise our analyses of 'anti-politics' and punitiveness.

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This chapter argues that institutionalist accounts of punishment, crime, and inequality should look to the thinning of political ideologies and its institutional implications. It explores the claim according to which thin ideologies such as populism, technocracy and plebiscitarianism, have institutional ambitions and tend to incentivise reforms that favour executive discretion and a politics of disintermediation. This claim is illustrated by reference to Italy both during and after the Eurozone crisis. Italy functions as a starting point for a broader discussion of how ideologies might change institutions, and therefore the penal incentives that follow from particular institutional configurations. The chapter argues that institutional changes rooted in thin ideologies may have long-term effects on punishment by incentivising a more adversarial and retaliatory approach to conflict – and thence to crime and deviance – and dis-incentivising a more negotiated and reintegrative approach to conflict, including the type of interpersonal conflict represented by crime and deviance.