Although habitat fragmentation is a major threat to global biodiversity, the demographic mechanisms underlying species loss from tropical forest remnants remain largely unexplored. In particular, no studies at the landscape scale have quantified fragmentation's impacts on colonization, extinction, and local population growth simultaneously. In central Amazonia, we conducted a multiyear demographic census of 292 populations of two leaf-inhabiting (i.e., epiphyllous) bryophyte species transplanted from continuous forest into a network of 10 study sites ranging from 1, 10, and 100 to 110,000 ha in size. All populations experienced significantly positive local growth ( ) and a nearly constant per-generational l 1 1 extinction probability (15%). However, experimental leaf patches in reserves of ≥100 ha experienced nearly double (48%) the colonization probability observed in small reserves (27%), suggesting that the proximate cause of epiphyll species loss in small fragments (≤10 ha) is reduced colonization. Nonetheless, populations of small fragments exhibit rates of colonization above patch extinction, positive local growth, and low temporal variation, which are features that should theoretically reduce the probability of extinction. This result suggests that for habitat-tracking metapopulations subject to frequent and stochastic turnover events, including epiphylls, colonization/extinction ratios must be maintained well above unity to ensure metapopulation persistence.

Examining information requirements according to the negotiation categories of structure, strategy, procedure, outcome and behavior, this article calls for data on action types, results, and sources; on determinants of target susceptibilities to action types; on blockage and its costs; on issues under consideration, changing proposals and parties' changing positions on issues; on parties' perceived payoffs, and evaluations of win, loss and deadlock; on parties' evaluation of their security points, and efforts to alter security points; on potential tradeoffs; and on available and evolving conceptions of justice.

Internal wars occupy the largest sub-category of intractable conflicts (the other large sub-category being enduring rivalries between pairs of states). cases of intractable conflicts that were apparently resolved, whereas Cyprus (since 1955), Colombia (since 1964), and Sri Lanka (since 1983) furnish prominent examples of repeated attempts and failures at conflict management. Notably, Cyprus and Sri Lanka entered into new rounds of negotiations in 2002, just as Colombia appeared to be leaving its latest round emptyhanded. Comparisons between the two sets of cases can provide useful insights into the conditions for dealing with intractability, and possibly even timely commentaries on the chances of the ongoing negotiations.The concept of incentives provides an important lever for opening the door to solutions. Many types of analysis begin with the simple observation that parties do not change their behavior unless presented with a preferable alternative. There are two sides to the equation. On one hand, pain, cost, fatigue, and boredom can lower the perceived benefits from present conflict behavior, making alternative courses of action potentially more attractive in comparison. On the other hand, new incentives for new behaviors can make the present course of action pale in comparison. It can be hypothesized that under the first situation a lower level of incentives would be required to alter behavior than under the second. Thus, disincentives and incentives are distinct but inextricably linked, two sides of the same coin, separate but not separated.Timing is also important, again in two senses -in seizing a propitious moment, and in being cognizant of the effects of duration. Therefore, to produce changes in behavior, costs and benefits may not only be elements in a single calculation, but may also need to be linked across time, with

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Three approaches are rested as explanations of the outcome of the Oslo negotiations. Ripeness theory explains the onset of the Madrid negotiations, which then talked themselves into a mutually hurting stalemate, but it accounts only for the beginning of Oslo, not its outcome. Process analysis shows neither a formula-detail nor a concession-convergence process but a hybrid constructed substantive process with two turning points of toughness, alongside a two-phased procedural process created by the need to officialize the proceedings. This approach explains rather well the nature of the constructed outcome. Contending theories of mediation bring out the importance of seeking a settlement rather than a resolution, of turning track two into track one diplomacy, and of using a powerless rather than a muscled mediator. But they also show how the type of outcome reached at Oslo prepared its own undoing when brought back home.

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