The objective of this study is to analyze the relation between ownership concentration and corporate governance practices of a group of Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. We rely on the corporate governance index developed by the Report on Business (ROB) in 2002. Our empirical results are consistent with the expropriation effect argument that predicts a negative relation between deviation from the one share‐one vote rule and corporate governance best practices. In this context, the dominant shareholder has incentives to maintain weak internal controls in order to facilitate expropriation. In addition, consistent with prior research, our results give partial support to the substitution effect argument by showing a negative impact of ownership concentration on the board composition subindex. Copyright © 2007 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Recent empirical evidence indicates that the largest publicly traded companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership. This is the case in Canada where voting rights are often concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, mostly wealthy families. Such concentrated ownership structures can generate specific agency problems, such as large shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. These costs are aggravated when large shareholders don't bear the full costs of their decisions because of the presence of mechanisms (dual class voting shares, pyramids) which lead to voting rights being greater than the cash flow rights (separation). We assess the impact of separation on various performance metrics while controlling for situations when the large shareholder has (1) the opportunity to expropriate (high free cash flows in the firm) and (2) the incentive to expropriate (low cash flow rights). We also control for when the large shareholder has the power to expropriate (high voting rights, outright control and insider management) and for the presence of family ownership. The results support our hypotheses and indicate that firm performance is lower when large shareholders have both the incentives and the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders. Copyright 2007 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

The objective of this study is to analyse further the governance-performance relationship while improving on two methodological issues: control for endogeneity and firm performance measurement. To mitigate the endogeneity problem, we first focus on subsamples of firms for which we ex ante expect better corporate governance to cause better performance. Second, we use generalized least squares regressions for panel data. To control for potential measurement bias, we measure firm performance using data envelopment analysis (DEA). The research is conducted in Canada over a five-year period from 2001 to 2005. Corporate governance is measured based on the Report on Business corporate governance index published by the Globe and Mail. Overall, the results show that better governed firms are more efficient. This study is in line with a growing number of recent studies that propose alternative measures of firm performance. By using DEA, this study brings together the corporate finance and productivity literature.

The objective of this study is threefold. First, we present a review of the international studies that have investigated the link between firm‐level governance scores and performance. To our knowledge, this study is the first to provide a comprehensive review of this recent and growing literature. Second, we discuss potential methodological shortcomings of using governance indexes. Third, we propose directions for future research. Overall, a clear positive relation is found between governance ratings and performance in Europe and in emerging economies, whereas studies conducted in the US and Canada have generated mixed evidence. The empirical problems related to measurement, substitution between governance arrangements, endogeneity, and optimization across governance choices are discussed. Solutions are proposed to alleviate these concerns. Copyright © 2011 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.