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We examined the implementation statuses of a total of 5,919 foreign

No abstract

This paper argues that relative exchange rates between the host countries of foreign direct investment affect their competition for FDI. Specifically, if the host country currency appreciates against the source country's currency more than that of its rival, FDI inflows of the host country will decrease, while FDI inflows increase in the rival country. Using the data of Japanese FDI in nine Asian manufacturing sectors from 1981 to 2002, the paper examines the hypothesis in the context of the competition between China and ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand). Empirical results show that the relative exchange rate is a statistically significant factor that determines the relative inflows of Japanese FDI for manufacturing as a whole, and for such sub-sectors as textiles, food, electronics, transportation equipment, and others. Exchange rate policies of China and ASEAN-4 played a critical role in dynamically reshaping the geographic distribution of Japanese FDI in Asia. Copyright 2006 The Authors Journal compilation 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd .

China's leading position in high-tech exports is a myth created by outdated trade statistics, which are inconsistent with the trade based on global supply chains. Assembled high-tech products, made with imported key parts and components, accounted for 82% of China's high-tech exports. Current trade statistics mistakenly credit entire values of these assembled products to China, thus greatly inflate the export value. For instance, in 2009 China's export in the iPhone amounted US$4.6 billion, of which only 3.6% was the value added by Chinese workers; its annual export in laptop PC valued at US$52 billion, but assembly accounted for only 3% of the gross value. In addition, 83% of China's high-tech exports was attributed to foreign invested firms, in particular Taiwanese owned companies. Taiwan-IT companies have relocated 95% of their production/assembly capacity into and transferred mainland China to a top assembler of information and communication technology, such as laptop PCs, digital cameras and all i-products.