We examine the influence of corporate compensation policies on firms' tax aggressiveness in an emerging market where executive compensation is primarily in cash form. Based on a handcollected dataset of 958 firm-year observations of Chinese listed firms for the 2006-2012 period, we find that firms paying higher executive cash compensation are associated with lower tax aggressiveness. This relationship also holds for the excess cash compensation measures which control for executive shareholding, firm profitability, size, growth opportunity, and board independence. We further document that mutual funds ownership pressure firms paying higher compensation to reduce their tax aggressiveness, suggesting adverse selection by mutual funds on firms exhibiting risky tax avoidance activities. High leverage offsets the negative link between cash compensation and tax aggressiveness, indicating a complementary effect between debt and tax avoidance, and, hence, suggesting that creditor monitoring is weak. These results are robust to the system-GMM estimation, which simultaneously account for the endogeneity of executive compensation, tax aggressiveness, ownership and control, leverage, and corporate governance.Our findings on Chinese firms have important policy implications for developing countries around the world with concentrated ownership structure, weak institutional environment, widespread corruption, ineffective rule of law, and ongoing significant social and political transformation. JEL classifications: G3; M4 Arellano M, Bover O (1995) Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of errorcomponents models.
This paper considers the impact of U.K. practices with respect to the measurement and disclosure of intangible assets, focusing on R&D activities. We first update prior U.K. work relating R&D activities to market prices. Second, given the clearly identified role of disclosure outside of the financial statements in helping market participants value R&D expenditures, we consider whether market forces are generally sufficient to ensure adequate disclosures with respect to intangibles by considering the cases of two biotechnology firms involved in the issuance of misleading disclosures. Within this context, we consider how disclosure regulation and enforcement mechanisms have evolved in recent years, and how this evolution has likely been affected by our ‘scandal’ cases. Our conclusions are that the case of the U.K. does not give rise to any wide‐scale concerns about the economic ill‐effects caused by the current state of recognition and disclosure with respect to expenditures on intangibles. Further, market forces are unlikely to be sufficient in ensuring honest and timely disclosures with respect to intangibles, but the combination of official regulation and voluntary self‐regulation appears to have stemmed the tide of any such disclosure scandals in the U.K.
We demonstrate that, in China, firm investment efficiency gains are associated with the use of short‐term debt, especially its trade credit component. During the 2009–2010 economic stimulus plan, such effects were heightened and generally remained persistent in the 2011–2013 poststimulus period. Our findings support the view that the rollover pressure of short‐maturity debt and the information advantage of supply chain financing are both effective mechanisms for enhancing firm governance in an environment more susceptible to financial market incompleteness. Consequently, the enormous credit boost during the stimulus plan was more efficiently invested when channelled through firms' supply chains.
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