SUMMARY With the popularity of Internet and wireless networks, more and more network architectures are used in multi‐server environment, in which mobile users remotely access servers through open networks. In the past, many schemes have been proposed to solve the issue of user authentication for multi‐server environment and low‐power mobile devices. However, most of these schemes have suffered from many attacks because these schemes did not provide the formal security analysis. In this paper, we first give a security model for multi‐server environment. We then propose an ID‐based mutual authentication and key agreement scheme based on bilinear maps for mobile multi‐server environment. Our scheme can be used for both general users with a long validity period and anonymous users with a short validity period. Under the presented security model, we show that our scheme is secure against all known attacks. We demonstrate that the proposed scheme is well suitable for low‐power mobile devices. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
SUMMARYOwing to the popularity of wireless networks, the group key agreement (GKA) design is critical for providing secure group communications over an insecure wireless channel. In 2005, Nam et al. proposed a GKA protocol for imbalanced wireless networks in which an imbalanced wireless network consists of many mobile nodes with limited computing capability and a powerful node with less restriction. In 2007, Tseng showed that Nam et al.'s protocol is not a contributory GKA, while he also proposed a new GKA protocol. However, neither GKA protocol is concerned with dynamic member joining/leaving. This is an important functionality of GKA, especially for a wireless network environment. In this paper, we propose a dynamic group key agreement protocol for imbalanced wireless networks, and show that it requires less computation cost for dynamic member joining/leaving as compared to the previously proposed protocols. We also show that the proposed protocol is provably secure against passive attacks under the decision Diffi e-Hellman problem and the hash function assumptions. Furthermore, by the pre-shared two-party key between a mobile node and the powerful node in the existing imbalanced wireless networks, we propose a generalized GKA protocol that requires only several hash functions.
Telecare medical information systems (TMIS) allow patients remotely login medical service providers to acquire their medical information and track their health status through unsecured public networks. Hence, the privacy of patients is vulnerable to various types of security threats and attacks, such as the leakage of medical records or login footprints and the forgery attacks. Many anonymous three-factor authentication and key agreement (AKA) schemes have been proposed for TMIS with single server, but none of them is suited for TMIS with multiple servers. In this paper, we propose a biometric-based three-factor AKA scheme to protect user anonymity and untraceability in TMIS with multiple servers. We will construct a security model of a three-factor AKA scheme with user anonymity in TMIS with multiple servers, and give a formal security proof of the proposed scheme. The security of the proposed scheme is based on the elliptic curve decisional Diffie-Hellman problem assumption and hash function assumption. We will show that the proposed scheme is efficient enough for low-power mobile devices.
In a smart city, there are different types of entities, such as nature persons, IoT devices, and service providers, which have different computational limitations and storage limitations. Unfortunately, all of the existing authentication and key exchange (AKE) protocols are designed for either client–server or client–client authentication, including the ones designed for smart cities. In this paper, we present the idea of a compatible authentication and key exchange (CAKE) protocol which provides cross-species authentication. We propose the first CAKE protocol for a smart city that any two valid entities can authenticate with each other and create a secure session key without the help of any third party, while there is also no password table and no public key issuing problem. The entity can be a natural person having biometrics, an IoT device embedded with a physical unclonable function (PUF), or a service provider. Moreover, we extend the CAKE protocol to an anonymous CAKE (ACAKE) protocol, which provides natural persons an anonymous option to protect their privacy. In addition, both the proposed CAKE and ACAKE protocols can deal with the entity revocation problem. We define the framework and the security model of CAKE and ACAKE protocols. Under the security model, we formally prove that the proposed protocols are secure under the elliptic curve computational Diffie–Hellman (ECCDH) problem, the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman (DBDH) problem, and hash function assumptions. Comparisons with the related protocols are conducted to demonstrate the benefits of our protocols. Performance analysis is conducted and the experience results show that the proposed protocols are practical in a smart city.
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