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We divide consumers in the selling period into two types according to their purchasing behavior: strategic customers and myopic customers. We address the optimal inventory and pricing decision problem of a retailer considering strategic and myopic consumers with and without a quick response. The results indicate that the retailer should establish a higher price to sell only to myopic customers if there is a sufficient presence of myopic customers in the market, and the retailer should set a lower price to sell to myopic and strategic customers if the number of myopic customers in the market is relatively low. A quick response can decrease the initial ordering quantity and increase the retailer's profit when selling only to myopic customers or selling to both myopic and strategic customers. Moreover, a quick response is beneficial for the retailer to improve the product's retail price if the retailer wishes the two types of customers to purchase the product during the selling period. We also find that the pricing strategy considering strategic and myopic consumers under a quick response will increase profits more than the pricing strategy only considering myopic customers. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate and validate the proposed models and provide managerial insights.

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In recent years, research on the qualitative analysis of aquatic product using ultrasonic or biological impedance has received increasing attention. Unfortunately, aquatic product safety incidents occur now and then, thus new kinds of analytical techniques that are fast, nondestructive, and simple to operate would be advantageous. This article addressed a machine olfactory system for recognition of the storage life of a whole living mitten crab. A type of deep learning algorithm, namely stacked denoising auto‐encoders algorithm (SdA), was applied to extract effective features of the machine olfactory system sensors' responses. The traditional feature extraction methods such as principal component analysis and linear discriminant analysis were used for the purposes of comparison. Then the support vector machine (SVM) classifier was implemented for further qualitative classification. In addition, the crabs were analyzed for total volatile basic nitrogen and total viable counts during storage process. Validation experiments showed that the highest recognition rate (96.67%) was achieved by using SdA with SVM. This study may present a promising instruction for the storage life recognition of the living crab. Practical Application Evaluation of the freshness of mitten crab is of considerable importance to guarantee mitten crab quality. However, to our best knowledge, few reports on the development of an electronic‐nose for nondestructive evaluation of the quality of whole living crab are available. A machine olfactory system for recognition of the storage life of a whole living mitten crab was present in this study. Validation experiments showed the highest recognition rate based on the system. In summary, the metal‐semiconductor sensor‐based machine olfactory system presents some advantages including fast detecting, repeatability, and nondestructive. In the future, with the improvement of sensor performance and development of pattern recognition, it will be a favorable weapon for protecting the interests of consumers in aquatic market.

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Purpose: This study presents a game‐theoretic model in which a potential entrant platform expands a new business to compete with an incumbent platform. Findings: The results indicate that the potential entrant platform will never increase the market awareness of its new business beyond a threshold value, even if it is cost‐free. In addition, the profit of the incumbent platform may be even greater when facing competition. Furthermore, the optimal pricing of the potential entrant platform depends on the network effects. Conclusion and managerial implications: In order to compete with the incumbent platform, the potential entrant platform needs to increase its market awareness rationally, and the incumbent platform may accommodate the entry of a potential entrant under certain conditions.

This paper examines the pricing and choice of advertising schemes for a two‐sided platform considering two business models, each with two advertising schemes. In the “1‐n” model, the prices on the provider side are the same in the two schemes; however, the price in the “1‐1“ model is always higher under the “HA” scheme. The results suggest that the preferred choice for the platform regarding the advertising schemes is the same as that in the two models. We extend our model in several directions and draw some management insights for a two‐sided platform for the platform operator.

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