Although worship has a pivotal place in religious thought and practice, philosophers of religion have had remarkably little to say about it. In this paper we examine some of the many questions surrounding the notion of worship, focusing on the claim that human beings have obligations to worship God. We explore a number of attempts to ground our supposed duty to worship God, and argue that each is problematic. We conclude by examining the implications of this result, and suggest that it might be taken to provide an argument against God's existence, since theists generally regard it is a necessary truth that we ought to worship God.

Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism Y u jin Nag a sawa a nd K h a i Wager 4.1 Introduction A contemporary form of panpsychism says that phenomenality is prevalent because all physical ultimates instantiate phenomenal or protophenomenal properties. According to priority cosmopsychism, an alternative to panpsychism that we propose in this chapter, phenomenality is prevalent because the whole cosmos instantiates phenomenal or protophenomenal properties. It says, moreover, that the consciousness of the cosmos is ontologically prior to the consciousness of ordinary individuals like us. Since priority cosmopsychism is a highly speculative view our aim in this chapter remains modest and limited. Instead of providing a full defense of priority cosmopsychism, we try to show only the theoretical advantage of the view over panpsychism. This, however, by no means entails that we develop the view in logical space merely for its own sake. We offer instead a blueprint for a new alternative to panpsychism and explain how such a view avoids some of the most persistent problems for panpsychism while maintaining several of its strengths. 1 This chapter has the following structure. In section 4.2, we discuss panpsychism and priority monism, which are relevant to priority cosmopsychism. In section 4.3, we introduce priority cosmopsychism. In section 4.4, we show that priority cosmopsychism overcomes the main difficulties for panpsychism, including the problem of infinite decomposition and the combination problem. In section 4.5, we defend priority cosmopsychism against possible objections. Section 4.6 concludes.

In this paper we address Bernard Williams' argument for the undesirability of immortality. Williams argues that unavoidable and pervasive boredom would characterise the immortal life of an individual with unchanging categorical desires. We resist this conclusion on the basis of the distinction between habitual and situational boredom and a psychologically realistic account of significant factors in the formation of boredom. We conclude that Williams has offered no persuasive argument for the necessity of boredom in the immortal life. 1

Anselmian theists, for whom God is the being than which no greater can be thought, usually infer that he is an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. Critics have attacked these claims by numerous distinct arguments, such as the paradox of the stone, the argument from God's inability to sin, and the argument from evil. Anselmian theists have responded to these arguments by constructing an independent response to each. This way of defending Anselmian theism is uneconomical. I seek to establish a new defence which undercuts almost all the existing arguments against Anselmian theism at once. In developing this defence, I consider the possibility that the Anselmian God is not an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being.

No abstract

This paper argues that Divine Command Theory is inconsistent with the view, held by many theists, that we have a moral obligation to worship God.

This chapter contends that the problem of evil arises not only for theists but also for atheists. To demonstrate this, focus is placed on ‘the problem of systemic evil’, where this is the problem of accounting for the violent, cruel, and unfair system of natural selection, a system which guarantees pain and suffering for uncountably many sentient beings. Unlike the traditional problem of evil, which concentrates on specific events, the more challenging problem of systemic evil emphasizes that the entire biological system is evil. Despite the systemic nature of evil, both theists and atheists typically uphold ‘existential optimism’, the thesis that the world is overall a good place and that we should be grateful for our existence in it. The combination of systemic evil and existential optimism gives rise to the ‘existential problem of systemic evil’, and this is a problem that theists have greater resources in answering than do atheists.

Perfect being theism is a version of theism that says that God is the greatest possible being. Although perfect being theism is the most common form of monotheism in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition, its truth has been disputed by philosophers and theologians for centuries. Maximal God proposes a new, game-changing defence of perfect being theism by developing what the book calls the ‘maximal concept of God’. Perfect being theists typically maintain that God is an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being but, according to Maximal God, God should be understood rather as a being that has the maximal consistent set of knowledge, power, and benevolence. The book argues that once we accept the maximal concept, we can establish perfect being theism on two grounds. First, we can refute nearly all existing arguments against perfect being theism simultaneously. Second, we can construct a novel, strengthened version of the modal ontological argument for perfect being theism. The book concludes that the maximal God concept provides the basis for a unified defence of perfect being theism that is highly effective and economical.