Including R&D risk, this paper considers the choices of R&D spillovers in a simple non‐tournament cost‐reducing R&D duopoly game with Bertrand competition. It turns out that the two firms never disclose any of their R&D information when considering their R&D non‐cooperatively. However, if the firms decide their R&D cooperatively, we show, though they would always fully share their information when the risk of R&D is low, they would not disclose any of their R&D information when the market competition is fierce, the R&D risk is high and the R&D is efficient.
This paper investigates the effects of the government's input subsidy and output subsidy in a green supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. We find the input subsidy does not necessarily give rise to a higher R&D input, while the output subsidy does not necessarily lead to a higher output. The comparison is strongly dependent on the externality of the production and consumers' environmental awareness.
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