In this paper, we introduce performance feedback models to specify conditions under which organizations' decision makers are more (or less) likely to accept the risk and uncertainty of nonlocal interorganizational partnership ties rather than prefer embedded ties with partners with which they have either past direct or third-party ties. Learning theory suggests that organizations performing far from historical and social aspirations may be more willing to accept the uncertainty and risk of such nonlocal ties with relative strangers. An analysis of Canadian investment banks' underwriting syndicate ties from 1952 to 1990 supports predictions from learning theory and, in addition, indicates that inconsistent performance feedback (i.e., performance above either historical or social aspirations but below the other) triggers the greatest risk taking in selecting partners.

We examine factors leading multiunit chains to adopt a common naming strategy, that is, naming components in a manner that identifies them with each other and the overall chain, rather than a local naming strategy that identifies a chain's components with their locations but not each other. Because chains' naming strategies have been shown to be critical to their success, we examine the effects of component failures on naming strategies. We advance organizational and interorganizational learning processes to explain chains' adoption of local naming strategies, which stress local adaptation, or common naming strategies, which emphasize standardization. In contrast to past research emphasizing learning from success, we focus on learning from the failure of strategy, specifically, the failure of a chain's own and other chains' commonly and locally named components. Two fundamental results emerge from our analysis of Ontario nursing home chains' naming strategies from 1971 to 1996. One is that nursing home chains learned from their own and others' failures, and the second is that the chains learned less from failures when they had a historical investment in the failing strategy.

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W e draw upon institutional theory to investigate the interactive influences of institutional mechanisms-coercive, mimetic, and normative-on the diffusion of a controversial and socially stigmatized practice, same-sex partner health benefits, in Fortune 500 corporations between 1990 and 2003. Given the social stigma associated with domestic partnerships of lesbians and gay men during the period of the study, the provision of these benefits was highly controversial and induced intense contestation between proponents and opponents of the institution of equal treatment for lesbian and gay employees. We explore the diffusion of theses benefits using data on cumulative adoptions by similar others, state laws forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation, and overall tenor in press coverage of the benefits. Our analysis shows that the cumulative number of adoptions within industry increased the positive effect of state laws on the corporation's decision to provide the benefits. However, the cumulative number of adoptions in the state of the corporation's headquarters decreased the positive effects of both state laws and overall tenor in press coverage on such a decision. Accordingly, our study contributes to institutional theory by pointing to complex interactive influences of institutional mechanisms on the institutionalization of contested practices, and to the literature on lesbian and gay issues in the workplace by studying factors influencing organizational decisions to adopt policies supportive of lesbian and gay employees.

While organizations and individuals tend to focus on learning from success, research has shown that failure can yield crucial insights in various contexts that range from small mistakes and errors, product recalls, accidents, and medical errors, to large-scale disasters.This review of the literature identifies three mechanisms-opportunity, motivation, and ability-through which individuals, groups and organizations learn from failure, and it bridges the gaps between different levels of analysis. Opportunity to learn from failure mostly takes the shape of more information about errors and failures that are generated by one's own and others' prior failures or near-failures. Motivation to learn from failure is hindered by punitive leaders and organizations. Finally, ability to learn from failure partly relies on inherent attitudes and characteristics; but can be further developed through thoughtful analysis and transfers of successful routines. Our review leads us to distinguish between erroneous versus correct processes and adverse versus successful outcomes to better understand the full gamut of events that are faced by organizations. We identify the existence of noisy learning environment, where spurious successes (when erroneous processes still lead 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 2 to successful outcomes) and spurious failures (when correct processes are combined with adverse outcomes) lower the opportunity to learn. Considering noisy learning situations is helpful when understanding the differences between slow-and fast-learning environments.We conclude our review by identifying a number of unexplored areas we hope scholars will address to better our understanding of failure learning.

We find support for the relationship between patient safety leadership and patient safety behaviors such as learning from safety events. Formal leadership support for safety is of particular importance in small organizations where the economic burden of safety programs is disproportionately large and formal leadership is closer to the front lines.

Past research on group diversity tends to overlook organizational contextual and group process variables. Although recent studies have revealed the main effects of group diversity on intra-group conflict, it is important to examine the contextual factors reducing or facilitating those effects on intra-group conflict. This paper presents a conceptual analysis and research proposals that build on past research on intra-group conflict and organizational culture to examine the relationships between organizational culture, intra-group conflict, and group diversity. The paper proposes that organizational cultural intensity and content have direct impact on intra-group conflict and moderate the relationship between group diversity and intra-group conflict, depending on the degree of value congruence and the value content shared among group members.

: The proposed organizational slack measure assesses modifiable organizational factors in hospitals and has the potential to explain variance in important health care system outcomes. Further assessments of the psychometric properties of the organizational slack measure in acute and long-term care facilities are underway.