No abstract

No abstract

The current audit environment encourages auditors to conduct defensive auditing procedures in lieu of using new, innovative, and potentially more effective audit procedures, due to concerns these procedures may be second‐guessed in litigation or by audit inspectors such as the PCAOB. As a result, auditors may prefer traditional “generally accepted” procedures over innovative procedures that are potentially more effective. We test recent proposals that an Audit Judgment Rule (AJR) encourages the use of innovative, and potentially more effective, audit procedures analogous to the similar Business Judgment Rule that affords legal protections to corporate directors. Under an AJR, litigators or audit inspectors could not second‐guess auditor judgments, even if they perceive that alternate judgments would have ordinarily been reached, provided the auditor's judgment was made in good faith and in a rigorous manner. However, the AJR's requirements that auditors must defend the rigor of their innovative judgments could potentially backfire and lead auditors to select more traditional procedures. Under the framework of goal activation theory, we conduct an experiment with audit managers and seniors and find that an AJR makes auditors less likely to select innovative audit procedures, particularly when audit risk is high. They do so despite believing the innovative procedures to be more effective than the traditional procedures. Findings from a supplementary experiment with experienced auditors further suggest that national office affirmation of the reasonableness of the procedures does not help overcome this effect. Overall, our findings suggest that an AJR may have the unintended consequence of further increasing auditors' focus on more traditional, and potentially less effective, audit procedures.

No abstract

National office consultations (NOCs) are a mechanism intended to enhance audit quality, consistent with the logic of professionalism inherent in the audit profession. Yet research indicates that the competing logic of commercialism has become institutionalized in audit firms. We examine how the coexisting and conflicting logics of professionalism and commercialism manifest themselves in the current NOC dynamic. Specifically, we interview 22 highly experienced Big 4 audit firm partners to investigate how key actors engage in institutional work that creates, maintains, and disrupts the influence of professionalism and commercialism in NOC practices. We observe a swing of the pendulum: in the wake of SOX, audit firms adopted professionalism‐based practices which involved creating a more authoritative, “Oz”‐like national office identity, while in recent years key actors' institutional work reconfigured NOC practices and placed a renewed focus on commercialism. Our findings bring to light a number of implications that offer opportunities for future research. Although the new client‐inclusive culture aims to improve audit outcomes by encouraging consultations and fostering open dialogue with clients, it also exposes the national office to relationship‐management pressures and client‐service demands. Thus, practices developed to uphold professionalism also created a channel for commercialism‐focused practices, leading to unintended second‐order effects.