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This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard-to-predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information. Copyright University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2006.

We investigate the economic forces that influence noncompliance with mandatory compensation disclosures and the effect of a subsequent focused enforcement action. We utilize SEC evaluations of compensation disclosures mandated by rules adopted in 2006 to examine whether noncompliance is associated with excess CEO compensation, proprietary costs, or previous media attention. We further test whether subsequent CEO compensation declines after the SEC publicly identifies noncompliance. We construct measures of defective disclosures from SEC critiques and find that disclosure defects are positively associated with excess CEO compensation and media criticism of CEO compensation during the previous year. We find no evidence supporting the contention that compensation disclosure defects are associated with proprietary costs. Furthermore, we are unable to document that the level of disclosure defects identified by the SEC is associated with a reduction in excess CEO compensation in the subsequent year. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: M52, G32, G38.

This study examines the effect of product market competition on managerial disclosure of earnings forecasts using large reductions in U.S. import tariff rates to identify an exogenous increase in competition for domestic firms in U.S. product markets. Our difference-in-differences estimations show that tariff reductions are associated with a significant decrease in management forecasts of annual earnings by U.S. domestic firms. Further, this decrease is more pronounced when the tariff rate reduction triggers a greater increase in imports and when the forecasts are likely to incur higher proprietary costs. Our findings are consistent with competition from existing rivals reducing voluntary disclosure through increased proprietary costs.

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Large earnings surprises and negative earnings surprises represent more egregious errors in analysts' earnings forecasts. We find evidence consistent with our expectation that egregious forecast errors motivate analysts to work harder to develop or acquire relatively more private information in an effort to avoid future forecasting failures. Specifically, we find that after large or negative earnings surprises there is a greater reduction in the error in individual analysts' forecasts of future earnings, and these individual forecasts are based more heavily on individual analysts' private information. This increased reliance on private information reduces the error in the mean forecast of upcoming earnings (even after controlling for the effect of reduced error in individual forecasts). As reliance on private information increases, more of each individual forecast error is idiosyncratic, and thus averaged out in the computation of the mean forecast.

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