Purpose Audit firm bankruptcy can have significant negative impacts on the stock prices of client firms. The purpose of this paper is to identify determinants of audit firm bankruptcy risk as measured by costs of debt. Design/methodology/approach Using audit firm data publicly available in Korea, this study empirically examines whether client portfolio, financial, and organizational characteristics are associated with the weighted average interest rates assumed by auditors. Findings The authors find empirical evidence that audit firms’ client portfolio characteristics, including the incidence (or number) of lawsuits against the auditor, the proportion of audit clients under surveillance, the proportion of initial audit engagements, and the proportion of listed companies of audit clients, are positively associated with the cost of debt. The authors also find several financial and organizational characteristics associated with the cost of debt. Practical implications The findings of this study suggest that client portfolio characteristics as well as financial and organizational characteristics are important determinants of the cost of debt in audit firms, and that these characteristics are different from those of firms in other industries. Identifying the determinants of audit firms’ cost of debt provides insight to regulators, client firms, and capital market participants. Originality/value This study examines the default risk of audit firms that play an important monitoring role in capital markets. By utilizing unique data about audit firms available in Korea, this study is the first study to empirically examine the effect of detailed audit firm characteristics on audit firm’s default risk.

This study examines the association between auditors' litigation risk and audit firm attributes. Using professional liability insurance premiums as a proxy for auditors' litigation risk, we present evidence that the risk is lower in audit firms having: (1) separate non-audit and audit divisions; (2) a higher proportion of partners; and (3) a higher annual growth in number of CPAs employed. Additionally, we find that the risk is higher in audit firms having: (1) operating losses; and (2) high revenue growth. Our results are consistent with the idea that audit firms' financial condition and organizational structure affect their independence/ expertise, and, in turn, their litigation risk. Our results are broadly supportive of the PCAOB's (2015) and US Department of Treasury's (2008) views that investors, audit committees, management, and other regulators could benefit from having access to financial and organizational information about audit firms.

(2016). The effect of CEO turnover on audit report lag and management discretionary report lag: evidence from Korea. Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 13 (1) The effect of CEO turnover on audit report lag and management discretionary report lag: evidence from Korea Abstract This study empirically investigates the effect of a CEO turnover on audit report lag (ARL), discretionary report lag (DRL) and total report lag (TRL). The object of this study is to provide empirical evidence for the responses of both the CEO and the external auditor on audit risk increases and information asymmetry that occur as a result of a CEO turnover. According to the previous study on CEO turnovers, the CEO turnover would increase audit risk and information asymmetry (Sohn et al., 2014). In this situation, the CEO has an incentive to provide timely information to decrease the monitoring costs and cost of debt . It is expected that an external auditor spends a large amount of time on audit procedures to lower the audit risk when the CEO changes. Therefore, the CEO turnover would have a conflicting effect on the ARL and DRL.The results of the analysis are as follows. First, the ARL increases and DRL decreases when the CEO changes, which suggests that an external auditor spends a great amount of time on audit procedures to lower the audit risk because the audit risk increases when the CEO changes. A new CEO provides information faster to reduce monitoring costs and cost of debt that occur due to information asymmetry. Second, the ARL increases and DRL decreases as the frequency of CEO turnover increases. An external auditor would estimate the audit risk as being high if the CEO changes more frequently. To lower the audit risk to an acceptable level, many audit hours are spent on audit procedures by an external auditor, which increases the ARL. A new CEO has an incentive to provide timely information when the CEO changes more frequently. Thus, the DRL decreases as the frequency of CEO turnover increases.

This study investigates the relation between tax avoidance and discretionary expenses. The object of this study is to present the empirical evidence on whether additional cash from tax avoidance is used on discretionary expenses. Tax avoidance is estimated using the model suggested by Desai and Dharmapala (2006). Discretionary expenses are estimated using the index suggested by Roychowdhury (2006), which are selling and administrative expenses except taxes and dues, depreciation expenses, amortization expenses, rent expenses and insurance expenses because the management cannot manage these expenses discretionarily. Research expense and ordinary development expense are included in discretionary expenses. The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, tax avoidance is positively associated with discretionary expenses. This result means that the management spends additional cash from tax avoidance on discretionary expenses. Second, the ownership percentage of foreign investors weakens the positive relation between tax avoidance and discretionary expenses. This result suggests that foreign investors monitor the management’s discretionary decision effectively. Third, the positive relation between tax avoidance and discretionary expenses is weakened as the ownership percentage of a major stockholder increases

<p>In this study, we examine the determinants of enforcement action by the Financial Supervisory Service of Korea from the perspective of audit firms. Enforcement action is an indication of audit failure. Both client- and audit firm-specific factors are involved in its occurrence. Most published studies of enforcement after audit failure focus on client characteristics because details about audit firms from financial statements and information about organizational structure are not publicly available. However, examining the issues surrounding enforcement from the perspective of audit firms may also be valuable in elucidating the potential determinants of audit failure resulting in enforcement action. Utilizing publicly available data from audit firms in South Korea, we identify several audit firm characteristics as determinants of enforcement action. The results of our empirical analysis reveal that the likelihood of audit failure is positively associated with the ratio of accounts receivable to total assets, the ratio of audit fees to total revenue, the ratio of partners to the total number of CPAs, CEO ownership, and age of audit firms. In addition, the likelihood of audit failure is negatively associated with ownership concentration and profitability. These associations are more pronounced in non-affiliated audit firms than affiliated audit firms. Several useful implications for regulators are described for improving audit quality by means of enforcement action.</p>