A Deviation from competitive neutrality is one of the main problems faced by Chinese state-owned enterprises. Based on the orientation of the classification reform of state-owned enterprises to all kinds of enterprises, we discuss the competitive neutrality of state-owned enterprises with special functions from the perspectives of enterprise policy burden and enterprise profits. The research herein shows that state-owned enterprises, as the main entities of policy burden, have undertaken social responsibilities such as helping the government to stabilize employment, which has caused problems such as creating redundant employees, reducing the efficiency of employees, and reducing the profits of enterprises. To make up for the loss of profits of enterprises that bear the policy burden, the government provides them with implicit guarantees, which makes it easier for them to obtain bank loans and other external factors, and the asset–liability ratio of enterprises increases, which comprises the problem concerning a deviation from competitive neutrality that the United States and other western countries have surmised. However, the empirical study found that the deviation from competitive neutrality in financing actually reduced the profits of enterprises, that is, the state-owned enterprises faced a certain competitive disadvantage. Based on the research conclusion herein, this paper puts forward some enlightening findings on state-owned enterprise reform.
Local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) working together with local governments can promote economic growth. However, an increase in the implicit contingent liabilities of local governments due to implicit guarantees given to SOEs has a negative effect on economic growth. The classical socialist theories and the economic stability in each financial crisis of China show that the macroeconomic efficiency of SOEs is more important than the microeconomic efficiency, and microeconomic efficiency in neoclassical economic theory cannot reflect the nature of SOEs. It is of great practical and theoretical significance to make a more comprehensive and accurate judgment on the efficiency of SOEs. This paper constructs an index of local governments’ implicit contingent liabilities in 31 provinces based on the 488 local SOEs to study the impact of implicit contingent liabilities, and the time period is the year 2007 to the year 2020. Our findings show that an increase in local SOEs’ assets suppresses economic fluctuations at the cost of increasing government’s implicit contingent debt and has a negative impact on economic growth. Unlike the fiscal influence path of explicit debt, implicit contingent debt restrains local economic growth through financial markets. The deleveraging of local SOEs and improving their efficiency can improve the overall efficiency of local funds and reduce the negative effect of local governments’ implicit contingent liabilities on economic growth.
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