Contracting parties, such as the firm and its supplier, have cost-reducing incentives to make investments that support the unique transactions between them. However, to the extent that one party may renege on its contractual obligations, the other party incurring the cost of the relationship-specific investment bears additional risk and is less willing to invest such that sub-optimal investment occurs. In countries where enforceability of explicit contracts is particularly weak, parties have incentives to signal their willingness to fulfill implicit claims and maintain long-term relationships. We predict that firms engage in income smoothing to send such a signal to their suppliers. Consistent with these expectations, we find that firms that both reside in countries with weak contract enforceability and operate in industries with a greater need for relationship-specific investments tend to smooth reported income more. We further decompose income smoothing into “informational” and “garbled” components and find that results are driven by the informational component of income smoothing. Our results support the important role that accruals play in providing information in the presence of incomplete contracts. JEL Classifications: F14, K12, L14, M41, M43

Recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest that blockholders (shareholders with ownership ≥ 5 percent) exert governance through the threat of exit. Blockholders have strong incentives to gather private information and sell their shares when managers are perceived to underperform. To prevent blockholders from selling their shares and the firm from suffering a stock price decline, managers align their actions with the interests of shareholders. As a result of the greater manager‐shareholder alignment, managers' actions are more likely to be in shareholders' best interest, and consequently there is less need for managers to manipulate earnings. Consistent with these predictions from economic theory, we find evidence that as exit threat increases, firms have higher financial reporting quality. Theory also predicts that the impact of blockholders' exit threat on financial reporting quality (FRQ) should increase as the manager's wealth is tied more closely to the stock price, and this is what we find. Our study contributes to the research on the impact of shareholders on FRQ and to an emerging literature on the impact of blockholders in financial markets. Blockholders play an important role in managers' reporting outcomes through their actions as informed investors.

Evidence suggests that managers have an incentive to keep information opaque with the market when negotiating with non-manager employees who can extract above-market rents from the firm. We provide empirical evidence which suggests that employee ownership mitigates this incentive. Using a matched sample design and employing a rich set of proxies for voluntary disclosure, we find that firms whose non-manager employees have strong bargaining power provide less voluntary disclosure whereas firms whose non-manager employees have employee stock ownership plans provide greater voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, the effect of employee ownership in generating better disclosure is particularly strong, the greater employees' negotiation leverage. Our results suggest a novel capital market benefit to utilizing employee ownership. Specifically, employee ownership appears to benefit the firm by not only aligning goals between the firm and its non-manager employees, but by also increasing disclosure from the firm to all of its stakeholders by mitigating the firm's need to keep information opaque.

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