Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of private investor's fair preference on the governmental compensation mechanism based on the uncertainty of income for the public-private-partnership (PPP) project. Design/methodology/approach Based on the governmental dilemma for the compensation of PPP project, a generalized compensation contract is designed by the combination of compensation before the event and compensation after the event. Then the private investor's claimed concession profit is taken as its fair reference point according to the idea of the BO model, and its fair utility function is established by improving the FS model. Thus the master-slave counter measure game is applied to conduct the behavior modeling for the governmental compensation contract design. Findings By analyzing the model given in this paper, some conclusions are obtained. First, the governmental optimal compensation contract is fair incentive for the private investor. Second, the private fair preference is not intuitively positive or negative related to the social efficiency of compensation. Only under some given conditions, the correlation will show the consistent effect. Third, the private fair behavior’s impact on the efficiency of compensation will become lower and lower as the social cost of compensation reduces. Fourth, the governmental effective compensation scheme should be carried out based on the different comparison scene of the private claimed portfolio profit and the expected revenue for the project. Originality/value This study analyzes the effects of private investor's fair preference on the validity of governmental generalized compensation contract of the PPP project for the first time; and the governmental generalized compensation contract designed in this study is a pioneering and exploratory attempt.
In recent years, the demand for infrastructure has been largely driven by the economic development of many countries. PPP has proved to be an efficient way to draw private capital into public utility construction, where ownership allocation becomes one of the most important clauses to both the government and the private investor. In this paper, we establish mathematical models to analyze the equity allocation problem of PPP projects through a comparison of the models with and without the effects of the theory of “contracts as reference points.” We then derive some important conclusions from the optimal solution of the investment ratio.
This paper studies the impact on project duration of different forms of over-confidence among general contractors executing such projects, in the context of retail apparel franchises. It goes on to consider the design of relevant incentives and, in particular, a compensation mechanism included in the initial contract that covers the event of contractor dismissal. This mechanism is examined as a means of hedging risk arising from the behavior of the principal. This includes a study of a two-way risk avoidance strategy, which is intended to make up for a shortfall in this regard in the existing literature. Outcomes derived from this research include the conclusion that different levels of confidence can have various impacts on optimal incentive coefficients and the effort level extracted from agents, thereby affecting the ultimate configuration of an optimal contract. Introducing a compensation mechanism covering the event of dismissal can serve to diminish the risk of an agent breaching their contract. This paper applies the concept of bounded rationality to a principal-agent model, ensuring conclusions that are attuned to reality.
Implicit coordination is an important research topic in the field of social cognition. Previous studies have studied implicit coordination behavior from the perspective of team mental model but ignored the internal mechanism of individual status competition motivation on implicit coordination behavior. Based on the differences of status competition motivation, the individual status competition motivation is divided into prestige-type and dominant-type. With knowledge sharing as the mediating variable and psychological safety as the moderating variable, this research constructed a process model of the influence of status competition motivation on implicit coordination behavior. The empirical study was carried out with a sample of 367 employees of 44 enterprises. The research results show the following findings: (1) Status competition has a differentiated impact on implicit coordination. Prestige-type status competition has a significant positive impact on implicit coordination behavior, while dominant-type status competition has a significant negative impact on implicit coordination behavior. (2) Knowledge sharing plays a mediating role between status competition (prestige-type status competition and dominant-type status competition) and implicit coordination. (3) Psychological safety positively moderates the relationship between prestige-type status competition, dominant-type status competition, and knowledge sharing. The research results provide a new perspective for the field of implicit coordination; reveal the mechanism of status competition motivation in implicit coordination, which is of great significance to the practice of enterprise team management and human resource management.
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