We investigate whether individuals' risk preferences change after experiencing a natural disaster, specifically, the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. Exploiting the panels of nationally representative surveys on risk preferences, we find that men who experienced greater intensity of the earthquake became more risk tolerant a year after the Earthquake. Interestingly, the effects on men's risk preferences are persistent even five years after the Earthquake at almost the same magnitude as those shortly after the Earthquake. Furthermore, these men gamble more, which is consistent with the direction of changes in risk preferences. We find no such pattern for women. (JEL D12, D81, J16, Q54)

We estimate a model of strategic voting by adopting a recently developed inequality-based estimator in a discrete-choice framework. The di¢ culty of identi…cation comes from the fact that preference and voting behavior do not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence for strategic voters. We obtain partial identi…cation of preference parameters from the restriction that voting for the least-preferred candidate is a weakly dominated strategy. The extent of strategic voting is identi…ed using variation generated by multiple equilibria. Using Japanese general-election data, we …nd a large fraction (68.2%, 82.7%) of strategic voters, only a small fraction (2.2%, 7.4%) of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies.

This paper studies the dispute resolution process with special emphasis on the dynamic patterns of litigation and settlement as well as the legal costs incurred and associated payments. I propose a dynamic bargaining model of dispute resolution with learning, estimate the model using micro data on medical malpractice disputes, and use the estimated model to assess the impact of proposed tort reforms. In my model the plainti¤ and the defendant do not have a common prior on the probability of winning court judgment and learning takes place as they bargain. Estimation results show that the model …ts all aspects of the data well. By conducting policy experiments using the estimated model, I …nd that capping jury awards or eliminating the contingencyfee arrangement signi…cantly shortens the expected time to resolution and lowers the expected total legal costs. On the other hand, loser-pay-all allocation of legal fees delay resolution and increase costs.

The willingness of individuals to engage in a harmful act may be influenced by direct personal experiences and the experiences of others, which can inform individuals about the likely consequences of their actions. In this paper, we examine how obstetricians respond to litigation. It is contended that obstetricians respond to increases in litigiousness by performing more caesarian sections. Using micro data, we examine whether physicians perform more caesarians after they or their colleagues have been contacted about a lawsuit. We observe very small, short-lived increases in caesarian section rates. It does not appear that the recent sharp rise in caesarian section rates is in direct response to litigation. We present indirect evidence that the increase may instead represent a change in consumer tastes.