Considering the carbon emissions caused by the fresh-keeping of fresh agricultural products, this paper studied the rules of fresh-keeping decision-making in the two-echelon fresh agricultural product supply chain led by suppliers under the carbon cap-and-trade policy. In addition, we designed two contracts, cost-sharing contract and two-part pricing contract, to coordinate the supplier’s fresh-keeping decision and the supply chain’s revenue. The results show that: whether the carbon cap-and-trade policy is implemented or not, the higher the consumer’s preference for freshness and the lower the price sensitivity coefficient of consumers, the more favorable it is for suppliers to improve their fresh-keeping efforts. Under the implementation of carbon cap-and-trade policy, suppliers’ fresh-keeping efforts are only related to the carbon transaction price, not the carbon cap; the higher the carbon transaction price, the less the supplier’s fresh-keeping efforts, but the more the supplier’s income; the smaller the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction and the larger the coefficient of carbon emission reduction, the more favorable it is for suppliers to increase their fresh-keeping efforts; both cost-sharing contract and two-part pricing contract can coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products, but they have different application scope and coordination effect. These conclusions are of great significance to the operation and management of fresh agricultural products suppliers, the improvement of consumers’ quality of life and the protection of ecological environment under carbon cap-and-trade.
From the perspective of regional product standardization construction, the evolutionary game models of standardized collaborative production of fresh agricultural product suppliers with or without government participation were built respectively, and the stability of the main strategy choice was discussed. The results show that when the standardization of regional fresh agricultural product is low and the participants' willingness to cooperate is high, the government can choose not to participate in the guidance, but if the government participates in the guidance but does not participate properly, it will have a reverse inhibition effect. When the standardization degree of regional fresh agricultural product is high, the government must effectively guide and regulate, regardless of the initial will of the participants. When government participation is effective, standardized production subsidies can promote the choice of collaborative strategies, while revenue-sharing mechanism and cost-sharing mechanism have little effect.
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