Social distancing practices have been widely recommended to curb the COVID-19 pandemic. However, despite the medical consensus, many citizens have resisted adhering to and/or supporting its implementation. While this resistance may stem from the non-negligible personal economic costs of implementing social distancing, we argue that it may also reside in more fundamental differences in normative principles and belief systems, as reflected by political orientation. In a study conducted in Brazil, we test the relative importance of these explanations by examining whether and how support for social distancing varies according to self-identified political orientation and personal economic vulnerability. Results show that while economic vulnerability does not influence support for social distancing, conservatives are systematically less supportive of these practices than liberals. Discrepancies in sensitivity to threats to the economic system help explain the phenomenon.

Low socioeconomic status (SES) consumers tend to be more price sensitive than their high-SES counterparts. Nonetheless, various economic-related burdens, such as mobility costs and lack of information, often hinder their ability to attend to scarcity—a phenomenon called “ghetto tax.” The current research moves a step further to show that even when very poor consumers can exert price sensitivity and are fully informed, a “psychological ghetto tax” often discourages them from doing so. Across five studies, we demonstrate that, relative to (a) high-SES consumers or (b) contexts of intragroup interaction, low-SES consumers are willing to pay higher prices and to accept lower value rewards to avoid commercial settings that require intergroup interaction (e.g., poor consumers in a high-end shopping mall). This effect is driven by the poor consumers’ heightened expectations of discrimination in upscale commercial settings, a concern virtually nonexistent among wealthy consumers. Companies’ inclusion statements emphasizing customer equality and/or customer diversity can serve as safety cues against stigmatized identities and increase low-SES consumers’ price sensitivity.

People tend to believe they are more (less) likely to experience positive (negative) outcomes than similar others. While research has consistently shown that feeling unrealistically optimistic about future events influences the adoption of self-protective behaviors, much less is known about the opposite relationship. We address this gap by examining whether and how self-protective behaviors influence unrealistic optimism in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Across two preregistered, high-powered experiments (N = 4,707), we document a generalized unrealistic optimism about the health risks associated with COVID-19. Critically, we show that prompting people to think about a precautionary behavior they often perform (i.e., mask wearing) magnifies this preexisting tendency. Egocentrism, but not self-enhancement and/or better-than-average effects, helps to explain the phenomenon. Theoretical contributions and substantive implications to health risk research and policy are discussed. Public Significance StatementThis research shows that past self-protective behaviors (e.g., mask wearing) enhance people's propensity to feel unrealistically safer than similar others. This finding suggests that although encouraging precautionary measures is fundamental to boost self-protection, communication strategies should not just focus on the safety benefits of such measures, but also ask individuals to be wary of this potential unintended psychological consequence.

Social distancing practices have been widely recommended to curb the COVID-19 pandemic. However, despite the medical consensus, many citizens have resisted adhering to and/or supporting its implementation. While this resistance may stem from the non-negligible personal economic costs of implementing social distancing, we argue that it may also reside in more fundamental differences in normative principles and belief systems, as reflected by political orientation. In a study conducted in Brazil, we test the relative importance of these explanations by examining whether and how support for social distancing varies according to self-identified political orientation and personal economic vulnerability. Results show that while economic vulnerability does not influence support for social distancing, conservatives are systematically less supportive of these practices than liberals. Discrepancies in sensitivity to threats to the economic system help explain the phenomenon.

When considering a charitable act, consumers must often decide on how to allocate their resources across a multitude of possible causes. This article assesses how the relative “urgency” of the causes under consideration (i.e., how critical to human survival the causes are) shapes preferences for specific causes among higher and lower social class consumers. Across a series of studies in a highly unequal socioeconomic environment (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), we demonstrate that lower-class consumers prefer to donate to urgent causes (e.g., alleviating hunger) compared to non-urgent causes (e.g., encouraging cultural activities), whereas the effect reverses among higher-class consumers. Contrasting experiences with scarcity across social classes vary the consumers’ intrinsic sympathy toward people’s unmet basic needs, which in turn shapes donation allocation preferences. Consistent with this theoretical rationale, class differences in charitable allocations decrease when (a) vivid contextual cues induce sympathy among both higher- and lower-class consumers or (b) the experience with scarcity is similar across social classes. Thus, although class differences in preferences for specific causes can be shifted with relative ease, our findings suggest that those who have the most to give do not spontaneously prioritize what is most urgently needed in society.

Background: Previous studies that describe the negative association between temporary deferrals and donor return rates commonly come from settings where mechanisms are in place to win back lapsing donors. There is little evidence on the size and prevalence of this negative association in settings with no such retention activities.Study Design and Methods: We use data from more than 2 million donation attempts made at a blood collection agency in Brazil over a 26-year period. We describe the distribution of deferrals across donor demographic and behavioral characteristics, and estimate multivariate survival analysis models with matched samples to measure the impact of deferrals on return rates. We control for sex, race, age, education, donation type, number of previous attempts, previous donations, and previous deferrals. We test for heterogeneous effects in interaction models with selected donor demographic and behavioral characteristics.Results: Temporary deferrals were associated with a 50% decrease in the likelihood of return. Although the effect was observed for all population subgroups and across the full length of the dataset, it varied in magnitude. The influence of deferrals was more negative among older donors and those reporting replacement motives, and less negative among more educated donors and those with a previous donation. Discussion: We found that temporary deferrals meaningfully harm donor careers in a setting where specific retention activities are absent. Although the effects are widespread across the population and persistent in time, there are also heterogeneities, which must be considered when designing interventions targeted at wining-back specific groups of deferred donors.

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