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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to unpack the “black box” of the relationship between contract and inter-organizational trust, both theoretically and empirically. Two mediators, namely perceived safeguard and restriction, are identified to build up two seemingly contrary possible paths between contract and trust from current literature. Both paths are tested in the context of Chinese construction industry due to our access to sample.Design/methodology/approachA survey of 295 contractor-subcontractor relationships from Chinese construction industry was conducted. A three-step multiple regression model was employed to test the mediating effect of perceived safeguard and restriction. Then, a hierarchical regression model was used to test the possible moderating effect of bilateral transaction-specific investment.FindingsThe empirical results support the mediating effect of perceived safeguard between contract and trust in the construction subcontracting industry. Bilateral transaction-specific investments enhance the positive effect of contract on safeguard perception.Originality/valueTheoretically, this study contributes to governance literature by opening up the “black box” of the relationship between contract and trust. It provides a better understanding of how and when contract complexity impacts trust, instead of simply focusing on whether contract and trust act as complements or substitutes. Practically, this study provides guidelines for construction firms to decide the degree of contract complexity under various degrees of bilateral transaction-specific investments to enhance the other party’s trust, so as to improve performance outcomes.

Purpose This paper aims to investigate how and when different dimensions of trust and contracts interact to influence the development to negotiation strategies. Specifically, it explores how different dimensions of trust and contracts are combined to influence dispute negotiation strategies when cooperation parties have or do not have expectations of continuity. Design/methodology/approach This paper theoretically identified and empirically examined the interaction effect of trust and contract on dispute negotiation strategies in contractor–subcontractor relationships, by developing a conceptual framework and conducting a questionnaire survey comprising more than 300 disputes in the Chinese construction industry. Hierarchical regression analysis was mainly used to test the hypotheses. Findings This paper finds that contractual control may weaken the effect of goodwill trust in fostering interest-based strategies in the presence of expectations of continuity, while it may strengthen the effect in the absence of expectations of continuity. Contractual coordination negatively moderates the relationship between goodwill trust and interest-based strategies only when parties have little expectations of continuity. Moreover, contractual control enhances the effectiveness of competence trust on fostering interest-based strategies. Practical implications This paper provides insights for practitioners to wisely use different governance mechanisms to manage negotiation strategies and generate desired outcomes of dispute resolution. Originality/value This paper provides a nuanced understanding of how the two types of governance mechanisms interact, by considering trust and contract as multi-dimensional constructs. It explicit the boundary conditions of both the substitute and complementary relationship between them.

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