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The growth of electronic healthcare (e-health) systems is promoted by the evolution of Internet of Things (IoT) technology, as this new environment provides a variety of alternatives for medical data collection. Traditional authentication models in e-health systems cannot be applied directly to scenarios requiring low-latency, real-time services. Providing a variety of means for data transmission is considered an important method to achieve effective control in e-health systems. However, this new approach also leads to security and privacy concerns as increasingly flexible communication services are introduced. Achieving effective authentication of medical data for different users while providing security guarantees in e-health systems is an interesting problem. In this paper, we present a permissioned blockchain-based identity management and user authentication(PBBIMUA) scheme for the e-health environment. Our scheme satisfies the extensive security requirements of medical data. An evaluation and security analysis show that performance, in terms of lightweight construction and lower network latency with high security standards, is improved in comparison to known methods. The experimental results show that the system has good efficiency.

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As a novel cryptographic primitive, signcryption realizes the function of digital signature and public‐key encryption simultaneously, at a cost significantly lower than that of the traditional sign‐then‐encrypt approach. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is little works focusing on attribute‐based signcryption (ABSC), especially in the setting of lattice‐based cryptography. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct hidden ABSC schemes based on lattice problems by presenting an ABSC scheme. In the random oracle model, the proposed scheme is proved to be indistinguishable against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks under the learning with errors assumption and existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks under the short integer solution assumption, respectively. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.