This paper constructs a capacity sharing model in a supply chain to reveal the factors affecting equilibrium outcomes. The results show that improving the technical level lowers capacity charge and increases seller profits in any case. Product differentiation has uncertain impacts on equilibrium outcomes, which depend on government regulations and oligopolistic competition models. The improvement of supplier's fixed component of marginal costs improves capacity sharing charge and reduces profits and consumer surplus. The government regulations and oligopolistic competition model directly affect equilibrium outcomes and welfare distribution. Government capacity control helps improve social welfare, but the effect of government subsidies is uncertain.
This study considers a differentiated duopoly, including domestic and foreign enterprises, in trade, analyzes the impacts of product differentiation and productivity variance on equilibrium results, and explores the optimal trade policy in different competition modes. We find that differentiated products can boost the supply of foreign enterprises in a Cournot competition. In a home‐leading Stackelberg duopoly, increasing tariffs decreases consumer surplus but improves the home country's social welfare. The optimum‐welfare tariff of a home‐leading Stackelberg duopoly cannot exceed that of the foreign‐leading Stackelberg duopoly. An easy or tight tariff policy can be optimal, depending on the parameters and duopoly modes.
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