The cross-regional coordinated dispatch of emergency supplies is a complex issue involving multiple topics, which covers multiple relationships and is affected by multiple variables. In the face of severe emergencies, relief supplies inside a specific area are far from meeting the explosive demand for emergency supplies. Besides, the supply of emergency materials and the disaster areas often have a spatial mismatch. Considering the attributes of externalities and public goods of emergency rescue, there are many obstacles for Local administration of emergency (LAE) and emergency logistics enterprises (ELE) spontaneously carrying out emergency supplies across regions. To solve this complexity problem, this research abstracts higher-level administration of emergency (HAE), LAE and ELE as the main stakeholders, with which a tripartite evolutionary game (ETG) model and a system dynamic (SD) model are constructed to analyze the dynamic mechanism of the complex system and to carry out the numerical simulation of the three-party game process. All the analyses and tests in this study have proved that the strong supervision of HAE has a decisive impact on the realization of cross-regional coordinated dispatch of emergency supplies, and the financial rewards and punishments imposed by HAE on other entities can accelerate or delay the achievement of the equilibrium strategy. However, when HAE chooses not to regulate, the cooperation willingness of LAE affects a lot that all the stakeholders will eventually reach equilibrium at (1,1,1) only if LAE chooses to actively carry out cross-regional coordinated dispatch of emergency supplies.
Abstract:The "New Normal" of Chinese economy represents the importance of economic performance. To analyze the provincial performance of the low-carbon economy in China, this paper constructed a three-stage dynamic Malmquist model considering the evolutionary promotion of productivity and technical progress. This paper incorporates the lag effect of capital accumulation into the performance evaluation to ensure transitivity and continuity. Furthermore, the inefficiency of the low-carbon economy arises from the disadvantages of resources endowments; therefore, it is necessary to eliminate these to evaluate managerial performance. This paper not only evaluates the provincial performance of the low-carbon economy but also suggests the sources and impetus of regional low-carbon economy development to find feasible transition paths. The empirical results reveal that the performance of the low-carbon economy presents a gradient distribution with obvious distinctions among the eastern, central, and western regions. Tianjin and Hebei should emphasize the optimal allocation of their own resources. Jiangxi and Hunan, by contrast, should focus on the perfection of the resources endowments.
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