Green agriculture can minimize the negative impact of agriculture on the environment, and green products are usually sold at a higher price due to their green attributes. This induces farmers to produce conventional products and falsely sell them as green products. To better promote the development of the green agricultural product market, we study the effect of retailers’ audit strategies, premium policies and farmers’ punishment policy on farmers’ decisions. We develop an evolutionary game theory model to describe evolutionary behaviors of farmers and retailers. Then, we analyze the evolutionary stability strategies in different scenarios and numerically simulate the evolution of farmers’ decisions and retailers’ decisions to verify theoretical results. The results show that the static premium policy is not an ideal policy to promote the development of green agriculture, whereas the dynamic premium policy, as well as the dynamic premium and farmers’ punishment policy, could lead to an effective green market. A higher maximum premium encourages more farmers to produce true green products and may allow more retailers not to audit farmers. Moreover, if the punishment for farmers increases, more retailers will not audit farmers, leading to lower audit cost. Finally, a lower audit fee could motivate more farmers to produce true green products.
In e-commerce, retailers often use return shipping insurance (RSI) to solve consumer returns, leading to a high return rate. To reduce this negative effect, we consider restricting rights to restrict consumers from obtaining RSI or buying products. We examine the effect of RSI on retail pricing strategies and profits under restricting rights. We formulate a game-theoretical model which consists of one insurer, a retailer and two types of consumers (informed consumers and uninformed consumers). By solving the model, we find that even though the insurer has restricted uninformed consumers from obtaining RSI, the retailer further restricts them from buying the product when the salvage value is low. Second, when the retailer and insurer have no right to restrict uninformed consumers, purchasing RSI may hurt the retailer. Third, when the insurer restricts uninformed consumers and the product salvage is low, the retailer adopts the high-price strategy; otherwise, the retailer adopts the low-price strategy. Finally, when the product salvage is low, the retailer will prevent uninformed consumers from buying the product by adopting the high-price strategy or using the restricting right. In this case, the insurer will set a higher premium.
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