What can reasonably be expected from the UNFCCC process and the climate conference in Paris 2015? To achieve transformative change, prevailing unsustainable routines embedded in socio-economic systems have to be translated into new and sustainable ones. This article conceptualises the UNFCCC and the associated policy processes as a catalyst for this translation by applying a structurational regime model. This model provides an analytical distinction of rules (norms and shared meaning) and resources (economic resources as well as authoritative and allocative power) and allows to conceptualise agency on various levels including beyond the nation states. The analysis concludes that the UNFCCC's narrow focus on emissions targets, which essentially is a focus on resources, has proven ineffective. In addition, the static division of industrialized and developing countries in the Convention's annexes and the consensus-based decision-making rules have impeded ambitious climate protection. The article concludes that the UNFCCC is much better equipped to provide rules for climate protection activities and should consciously expand this feature to improve its impact. Policy relevanceThe international community is negotiating a new global climate agreement, to be adopted at the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in December 2015 in Paris and to be applicable from 2020. This article analyses the successes and limitations the UN-FCCC has had so far in combating climate change and it develops recommendations how to enhance efforts within and beyond the framework of the Convention. From our analysis we derive two main recommendations for an effective and structurationally balanced treaty: First, multi-dimensional mitigation contributions going beyond emission targets could strongly improve countries' ability to tailor their contributions around national political discourses. Second, the UNFCCC regime should be complemented with another treaty outside of the UNFCCC framework. This 'Alliance of the Ambitious' would allow the pioneers of climate protection to move ahead and enjoy the benefits of co-operation. The dynamics generated through such a club approach could be fed back into the UNFCCC, leading to increased ambition by others in future commitment cycles.

The Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of 'hot air' generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independent check of the NDC's ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country does contain 'hot air', or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country categories and rise over time. Key policy insights. Without additionality testing, market mechanisms under the Paris Agreements might lead to an international diffusion of 'hot air'. To avoid this, an independent assessment of NDC ambition is in order. Otherwise, activities under the mechanisms need to undergo specific additionality tests.. Additionality testing of projects and programmes should build on the experience developed under the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms.. Bold approaches are needed for assessing additionality of policies. To avoid cumbersome assessment of all activities triggered by such policies, highly aggregated approaches are suggested, ranging from payback period thresholds for technologies mandated by regulation to minimum price levels triggered by carbon pricing policies. Over time, the stringency of threshold values should increase.

The impacts of the COVID-19 crisis and the global response to it will co-determine the future of climate policy. The recovery packages responding to the impacts of the pandemic may either help to chart a new sustainable course, or they will further cement existing high-emission pathways and thwart the achievement of the Paris Agreement objectives. This article discusses how international climate governance may help align the recovery packages with the climate agenda. For this purpose, the article investigates five key governance functions through which international institutions may contribute: send guidance and signals, establish rules and standards, provide transparency and accountability, organize the provision of means of implementation, and promote collective learning. Reflecting on these functions, the article finds that the process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), together with other international institutions, could promote sustainable recovery in several ways. Key policy insights:. The incoming UK presidency of the Conference of the Parties (COP) should urge Parties to present transformative sustainable stimulus packages alongside more ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDCs) at the postponed Glasgow Climate Conference (COP 26).. Specific principles and criteria for sustainable recovery should be adopted. A coalition of interested governments should work through institutions such as G20 to enable swift action even before COP 26.. The Glasgow Conference should establish a process to review the consistency of recovery packages with the Paris Agreement and their implementation, to support their sustainability and promote policy learning.. Developed countries and international financial institutions should renew their climate finance commitments, and work towards an increased long-term finance objective in the context of greening recovery packages.. At COP 26 governments could take stock of the 'Paris-compatibility' of international recovery support and adopt further guidance as necessary.

Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are commonly used by decision makers in order to derive climate policies. IAMs are currently based on climate‐economics interactions, whereas the role of social system has been highlighted to be of prime importance on the implementation of climate policies. Beyond existing IAMs, we argue that it is therefore urgent to increase efforts in the integration of social processes within IAMs. For achieving such a challenge, we present some promising avenues of research based on the social branches of economics. We finally present the potential implications yielded by such social IAMs.

A climate club to decarbonize the global steel industryDecarbonizing global steel production requires a fundamental transformation. A sectoral climate club, which goes beyond tariffs and involves deep transnational cooperation, can facilitate this transformation by addressing technical, economic and political uncertainties.

The 2010 UN climate conference in Cancún emphasised that 'Parties should, in all climate change related actions, fully respect human rights'. However, so far there is no further guidance. This article discusses the relevant legal human rights norms and two case studies from the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The first case (Bajo Aguán, Honduras) shows that the current absence of any international safeguards can lead to registration of highly problematic projects. The second case (Olkaria, Kenya) suggests that safeguards, introduced here as a side effect of World Bank involvement, can have a positive impact, but that it is necessary to have them based on human rights. It therefore seems recommendable for the UN climate regime to develop mandatory human rights safeguards.In addition or alternatively, individual buyer countries or groups of countries, such as the EU, could introduce their own additional requirements for CDM projects.

This article analyses human rights implications of projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the CDM is likely to expire in the near future, the experience gained should be used to inform the rules of the new mechanism to be established under the 2015 Paris Agreement. We argue that the CDM and the new mechanism, as international organisations under the guidance of UNFCCC member states, should apply the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Based on the experience drawn from three case studies (two hydro power projects in Barro Blanco, Panama, and Bujagali, Uganda, and one geothermal energy project in Olkaria, Kenya), we show that CDM projects, while in formal compliance with CDM rules, can lead to a number of human rights infringements. We conclude with a number of recommendations on how to achieve a greater recognition of human rights in the new mechanism under the Paris Agreement.

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