This paper seeks to define the main trends, arguments and problems regarding the question of method formulated by Twardowski and his students. In this regard, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, I situate Brentano's project of descriptive psychology within the context of disputes in the school of Twardowski concerning the method of both psychology and phenomenology, arguing that descriptive-psychological analysis was dominant in this respect. Second, the study explores the notion of eidetic phenomenology, as founded on a methodological procedure, which supposed to guarantee infallibility of its descriptions. To show this, I first reconstruct Brentano's concept of descriptive psychology, its object, its method and aims. Second, I track the changes and reinterpretations provided by Twardowski in his view of descriptivepsychological analysis. Third, I explore Witwicki's and Bandrowski's-both early students of Twardowski-discussions of the descriptive approach. I try to show that the former accepted psychologism, while the latter overcame it by means of logical analysis. Fourth, I suggest that the only student of Twardowski who renounced the Brentanian method was Ingarden, who developed eidetic phenomenology. Finally, I present Blaustein's-one of the last students of Twardowski-reappraisal of descriptive psychology and his critique of Ingarden's method. This controversy over the method of descriptive psychology reveals how one can situate Twardowski's legacy within early phenomenology in Poland.
The main purpose of the article is to reconstruct a therapeutic potential of phenomenology, in particular, within Edmund Husserl's and Eugen Fink's program of transcendental inquiry about time. However, the project of objective claims of phenomenology, which is presented in the Logical Investigations seems to exclude all therapeutic approach. Rather, the program postulates the striving for abstract "truths in themselves, " also it ignores the surrounding world, as well as intersubjectivity, and finally leads to the solitary life of a phenomenologist. How then is the therapeutic potential of phenomenology possible? The case of questioning plays the crucial role in the context of objective science. According to Husserl, each science which does not allow to ask "the most burning questions" is naïve, and therefore it limits the therapeutic potential. While focusing on propositions, objective phenomenology excludes all questions, indeed. In contrast to such a view, transcendental phenomenology allows to ask over and over again, and by doing so, it introduces the world, as well as intersubjectivity as horizons of phenomenological inquiry. Concluding, Husserl's collaboration with Fink presents such a communal effort into questioning about time. Therefore, "therapeutic potential" of phenomenology means precisely the methodological movement of the possibility for communal formulation of transcendental investigation.
This article presents the development of the phenomenological movement in Poland in the period . It focuses on the early reactions to phenomenology and the later consolidation of the group of phenomenologists in Lvov. The article also explores the context of Polish phenomenology, its main figures, and their texts. The author suggests that early phenomenology in Poland was a pluralistic discipline that developed in polemical discussions, including discussions with members of the Lvov-Warsaw school. Finally, the article summarizes the major contributions of phenomenologists to philosophy, psychology, and aesthetics in Poland.
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