It is generally assumed that slowing after errors is a cognitive control effect reflecting more careful response strategies after errors. However, clinical data are not compatible with this explanation. We therefore consider two alternative explanations, one referring to the possibility of a persisting underlying problem and one on the basis of the low frequency of errors (orienting account). This latter hypothesis argues that infrequent events orient attention away from the task. Support for the orienting account was obtained in two experiments. Using a new experimental procedure, Experiment 1 demonstrated post-error slowing after infrequent errors and post-correct slowing after infrequent correct trials. In Experiment 2, slowing was observed following infrequent irrelevant tones replacing the feedback signals.

The conflict monitoring model of M. M. Botvinick, T. S. Braver, D. M. Barch, C. S. Carter, and J. D. Cohen (2001) triggered several research programs investigating various aspects of cognitive control. One problematic aspect of the Botvinick et al. model is that there is no clear account of how the cognitive system knows where to intervene when conflict is detected. As a result, recent findings of task-specific and context-specific (e.g., item-specific) adaptation are difficult to interpret. The difficulty with item-specific adaptation was recently pointed out by C. Blais, S. Robidoux, E. F. Risko, and D. Besner (2007), who proposed an alternative model that could account for this. However, the same problem of where the cognitive system should intervene resurfaces in a different shape in this model, and it has difficulty in accounting for the Gratton effect, a hallmark item-nonspecific effect. The authors of the current article show how these problems can be solved when cognitive control is implemented as a conflict-modulated Hebbian learning rule.

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Cognitive control covers a broad range of cognitive functions, but its research and theories typically remain tied to a single domain. Here we outline and review an associative learning perspective on cognitive control in which control emerges from associative networks containing perceptual, motor, and goal representations. Our review identifies 3 trending research themes that are shared between the domains of conflict adaptation, task switching, response inhibition, and attentional control: Cognitive control is context-specific, can operate in the absence of awareness, and is modulated by reward. As these research themes can be envisaged as key characteristics of learning, we propose that their joint emergence across domains is not coincidental but rather reflects a (latent) growth of interest in learning-based control. Associative learning has the potential for providing broad-scaled integration to cognitive control theory, and offers a promising avenue for understanding cognitive control as a self-regulating system without postulating an ill-defined set of homunculi. We discuss novel predictions, theoretical implications, and immediate challenges that accompany an associative learning perspective on cognitive control. (PsycINFO Database Record

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Congruency sequence effects (CSEs) refer to the observation that congruency effects in conflict tasks are typically smaller following incongruent compared to following congruent trials. This measure has long been thought to provide a unique window into top-down attentional adjustments and their underlying brain mechanisms. According to the renowned conflict monitoring theory, CSEs reflect enhanced selective attention following conflict detection. Still, alternative accounts suggested that bottom-up associative learning suffices to explain the pattern of reaction times and error rates. A couple of years ago, a review by Egner (2007) pitted these two rivalry accounts against each other, concluding that both conflict adaptation and feature integration contribute to the CSE. Since then, a wealth of studies has further debated this issue, and two additional accounts have been proposed, offering intriguing alternative explanations. Contingency learning accounts put forward that predictive relationships between stimuli and responses drive the CSE, whereas the repetition expectancy hypothesis suggests that top-down, expectancy-driven control adjustments affect the CSE. In the present paper, we build further on the previous review (Egner, 2007) by summarizing and integrating recent behavioral and neurophysiological studies on the CSE. In doing so, we evaluate the relative contribution and theoretical value of the different attentional and memory-based accounts. Moreover, we review how all of these influences can be experimentally isolated, and discuss designs and procedures that can critically judge between them.

Over the past decade, many cognitive control researchers have studied to what extent adaptations to conflict are domain-general or rather specific, mostly by testing whether or not the congruency sequence effect (CSE) transfers across different conditions (e.g., conflict type, task sets, contexts, et cetera). The CSE refers to the observation that congruency effects in conflict tasks tend to be reduced following incongruent relative to following congruent trials, and is considered a prime measure of cognitive control. By investigating the transfer of this CSE across different conflict types, tasks, or contexts, researchers made several inferences about the scope of cognitive control. This method gained popularity during the last few years, spawning an interesting, yet seemingly inconsistent set of results. Consequently, these observations gave rise to a number of equally divergent theories about the determinants and scope of conflict adaptation. In this review, we offer a systematic overview of these past studies, as well as an evaluation of the theories that have been put forward to account for the results. Finally, we propose an integration of these various theoretical views in a unifying framework that centers on the role of context (dis)similarity. This framework allows us to generate new predictions about the relation between task or context similarity and the scope of cognitive control. Specifically, while most theories imply that increasing contextual differences will result in reduced transfer of the CSE, we propose that context similarity and across-context control follow a U-shaped function instead.