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Utility functions provide a natural and advantageous framework for achieving self-optimization in distributed autonomic computing systems. We present a distributed architecture, implemented in a realistic prototype data center, that demonstrates how utility functions can enable a collection of autonomic elements to continually optimize the use of computational resources in a dynamic, heterogeneous environment. Broadly, the architecture is a two-level structure of independent autonomic elements that supports flexibility, modularity, and self-management. Individual autonomic elements manage application resource usage to optimize local service-level utility functions, and a global Arbiter allocates resources among application environments based on resource-level utility functions obtained from the managers of the applications. We present empirical data that demonstrate the effectiveness of our utility function scheme in handling realistic, fluctuating Web-based transactional workloads running on a Linux cluster.

We introduce a unified framework that interrelates three different types of policies that will be used in autonomic computing systems: Action, Goal, and Utility Function policies. Our policy framework is based on concepts from artificial intelligence such as states, actions, and rational agents. We show how the framework can be used to support the use of all three types of policies within a single autonomic component or system, and use the framework to discuss the relative merits of each type.

Supply chain formation is the process of determining the structure and terms of exchange relationships to enable a multilevel, multiagent production activity. We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic features: hierarchical subtask decomposition, and resource contention. To decentralize the formation process, we introduce a market price system over the resources produced along the chain. In a competitive equilibrium for this system, agents choose locally optimal allocations with respect to prices, and outcomes are optimal overall. To determine prices, we define a market protocol based on distributed, progressive auctions, and myopic, non-strategic agent bidding policies. In the presence of resource contention, this protocol produces better solutions than the greedy protocols common in the artificial intelligence and multiagent systems literature. The protocol often converges to high-value supply chains, and when competitive equilibria exist, typically to approximate competitive equilibria. However, complementarities in agent production technologies can cause the protocol to wastefully allocate inputs to agents that do not produce their outputs. A subsequent decommitment phase recovers a significant fraction of the lost surplus.

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